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Terry Stops, Anonymous Tips, and Driving Under
the Influence: A Study of Illinois Law
The Honorable Charles Burns* and Michael Conte**
In the recent case of Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr.
22, 2014), the United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip
can support an investigatory stop in the absence of independent
corroboration by the arresting officer under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the fourteen years between Navarette
and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), in which the Court last
addressed anonymous tips, lower courts across the country struggled to
determine how United States Supreme Court precedents on anonymous
tips apply in the context of drunk or reckless driving. Illinois courts in
particular struggled with this question in the absence of any direct
guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court. This Article will examine how Illinois courts facing the question
of the propriety of a Terry stop based on an anonymous tip of drunk
driving have relied on cases in the slightly different context of
anonymous tips of possession of contraband such as guns and drugs,
but have adapted the analysis of these cases to apply to a situation such
as drunk driving in which the crime being committed presents an
immediate danger to public safety. The Article will show what other
factors—namely, (1) the degree to which the tip was truly anonymous
and whether a means exists of puncturing the tipster’s shield of
anonymity, (2) the specificity of the tip and the level of factual detail
provided, and (3) the level of immediate danger to the public presented
by the conduct described in the tip—courts must consider in order to
determine whether an officer properly relied on an anonymous tip of
drunk driving in making an investigatory stop. In light of the fact that
courts have held that less rigorous corroboration of the tip is required
where the tip describes drunk driving, an act that poses a grave and
immediate danger to the public, officers may act quickly to protect the
public from potentially drunk drivers so long as the tip contains some
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minimal indicia of reliability.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2008, California Highway Patrol dispatchers received
an anonymous tip, via 911, that a silver Ford F-150, license plate
8D949925, had run someone off the roadway on California’s Highway
1 and was last seen heading south on Highway 1 at mile marker 88.1 A
Highway Patrol dispatcher broadcast the information over the radio, and

1. People v. Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012).
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officers in the area heard the dispatch, located the suspect vehicle, and
initiated a traffic stop, without independently observing any reckless or
erratic driving.2 The officers detected the smell of marijuana and
searched the car.3 They found four large bags of marijuana in the bed
of the truck.4
The driver of the truck, Lorenzo Prado Navarette, and a passenger,
Jose Prado Navarette, charged with transporting marijuana and
possessing marijuana for sale, filed a motion to suppress the marijuana
recovered during the search, arguing that the arresting officers did not
have reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed because
the officers did not independently corroborate the tip of reckless
driving.5 The Court of Appeal of California, reviewing the trial court’s
denial of the motion to suppress, held that the traffic stop did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the tip was reliable, the officers
promptly corroborated innocent details of the tip, and a reckless,
possibly intoxicated driver represents a serious danger to public safety. 6
Did the court rule correctly in this case? Was the traffic stop a
legitimate exercise of the State’s power to investigate crimes and
protect the safety of the public? Or was it an unfair invasion of a
motorist’s privacy?
On October 1, 2013, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated
the importance of this issue by granting the Navarettes’ petition for
certiorari7 in Navarette v. California to answer the question of whether
“the Fourth Amendment require[s] an officer who receives an
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate
dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.”8 On April 22, 2014, the
Court answered that questioned in the negative, affirming the decision
of the California Court of Appeal.9 This Article will examine what
Illinois courts have had to say about this important issue, prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Navarette and without any direct guidance
from the Supreme Court, and consider how Illinois courts should
address the issue in the future.
It is beyond question that drunk drivers represent a serious threat to
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id. at *6–7.
7. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (mem.) (order granting certiorari).
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr. 22,
2014).
9. Navarette, No. 12-9490.
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public safety. A driver with blood alcohol concentration of between .08
and .10, or just over the legal limit, is eleven times more likely to be
involved in a single-vehicle crash.10 In 2011, the most recent year for
which figures are available, the number of people killed in the United
States in traffic accidents involving a drunk driver was 9878—31% of
the total traffic deaths that year.11
Public service announcements and other efforts to prevent drunk
driving by alerting the public of its dangers abound. Organizations
ranging from those specifically dedicated to fighting driving under the
influence (“DUI”), such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving,12 to federal
and state government agencies have reached out to the public in an
effort to prevent drunk driving. For example, the Illinois Secretary of
State’s office has produced “Faces of DUI,” a twenty-minute video of
interviews with DUI victims and victims’ families, DUI offenders, law
enforcement officers, and representatives of the legal and medical
communities, along with several shorter public service
announcements.13 The Illinois Secretary of State’s office has also
created a DUI Victim Wall, which displays pictures and testimonials
from victims and their families on the deadly effects of drunk driving,
and it gives presentations on traffic safety, often aided by Fatal Vision
goggles, which simulate the effects of alcohol and other drugs to
demonstrate how they impair a person’s ability to drive.14
In recent years, in addition to making such educational efforts, state
and local governments have also reached out to the public for assistance
in the enforcement of DUI laws by encouraging citizens to report drunk
drivers to police.15 Some of these efforts have been both creative and
elaborate. For example, Montgomery County, Maryland developed the
Operation Extra Eyes program, which trained pairs of citizen volunteers
to patrol the roads of the county and report suspected drunk drivers to
10. The ABCs of BAC: A Guide to Understanding Blood Alcohol Concentration and Alcohol
Impairment, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/links/sid/ABCsB
ACWeb/page2.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
11. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2011 DATA 1
(2012), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811700.pdf.
12. About Us, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org/about-us/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014).
13. JESSE WHITE, 2014 ILLINOIS DUI FACT BOOK 26 (2014), available at https://www.cyber
driveillinois.com/publications/pdf_publications/dsd_a118.pdf (referencing Secretary of State DUI
programs, including the “Faces of DUI” video).
14. Id.
15. See DARY FIORENTINO ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PROGRAMS
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES THAT AID MOTORISTS IN THE REPORTING OF IMPAIRED DRIVERS
TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2007), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/links/sid/3674Programs
AcrossUS/index.htm (describing the state cellular reporting programs being evaluated).

BURNS AND CONTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/30/2014 9:41 AM

Anonymous Tips

1147

law enforcement via police-issued radios.16 In Illinois, the Alliance
Against Intoxicated Motorists, a community organization formed by
citizens whose loved ones have suffered death or injury in drunk driving
accidents, initiated the Drunkbusters program in partnership with police,
the State of Illinois, and various Illinois county governments.17 Funded
with fines paid by DUI offenders, Drunkbusters encourages citizens to
report drunk drivers with their cell phones and, during holidays
statewide and year-round in select counties, rewards tipsters whose
information leads to an arrest with a $100 honorarium.18 Since 1990,
Drunkbusters has paid out more than $480,000 for the arrest of more
than 4800 motorists.19
Many additional states, such as Idaho, New Mexico, Ohio, and
Vermont, among others, have sought to boost citizen reporting of drunk
driving simply by creating a DUI reporting hotline and publicizing the
number with a media campaign.20 Similarly, the Illinois State Police
website encourages citizens to call state police from their cell phones to
report drunk driving as it occurs.21 A “Tip Sheet” for “Spotting &
Reporting Drunk Drivers” on the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control website directs citizens to call 911 to report drunk
drivers and explicitly tells them, “You do not have to give your
name.”22
Implicit in these programs, however, is a key assumption: that the
information citizens provide over these hotlines, which may be
incomplete or anonymous, can properly lead to an arrest and
16. TARA KELLEY-BAKER ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CITIZEN
REPORTING OF DUI—EXTRA EYES TO IDENTIFY IMPAIRED DRIVING 9–10 (2006), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/ExtraEyes/index.html.
17. Drunkbusters, ALLIANCE AGAINST INTOXICATED MOTORISTS, http://www.aaim1.org/dru
nkbusters.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
18. Id.; see FIORENTINO, supra note 15, at 18 (describing the “Drunk Buster” program as an
additional public reporting program); Graydon Megan & Andrea L. Brown, Cellphone Patrol:
More Citizens Are Reporting DUIs to Police, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 2011,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-08/news/ct-xnvigilantemotorists20110608_1_allianceagainst-intoxicated-motorists-report-unsafe-drivers-arrests (explaining the cash reward component of Drunkbusters).
19. Press Release, Alliance Against Intoxicated Motorists, Fines From Drunk Drivers Make
Roads Safer in Grundy County (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.aaim1.org/pdf/Drunk
busterspressrelease.pdf.
20. See FIORENTINO, supra note 15, at 3–4 (describing states that have a “DWI Dedicated
Program”).
21. Influenced Driving, ILL. STATE POLICE, http://www.isp.state.il.us/traffic/drnkdriving.cfm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
22. Spotting and Reporting Drunk Drivers: Tip Sheet, CAL. DEP’T ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
CONTROL (2007), http://www.abc.ca.gov/news/dui_prevention/report_drunk_drivers_tip_sheet.pd
f.
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conviction.23 Of course, a law enforcement officer’s ability to stop a
suspected drunk driver and test for sobriety, like all searches and
seizures, is limited by the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 6 of
the Illinois Constitution.24 To perform an investigatory stop, police
need only have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to
be committed.25 Some courts have held that a lower threshold of
reasonable suspicion applies in cases of suspected drunk driving, due to
the great danger to public safety that drunk drivers represent.26 Courts
in a number of states, including some courts of last resort, have weighed
in on whether an anonymous tip, uncorroborated by a police officer’s
own independent observations, may raise reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving that would permit an investigatory stop.27 Prior to the Navarette
case, although both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Illinois had acknowledged the danger to public safety of drunk
driving,28 neither had yet addressed this precise issue.
This Article will explore to what extent law enforcement in Illinois
may act on tips of drunk driving, particularly anonymous tips. The
Article will discuss two United States Supreme Court cases involving
investigatory stops based on anonymous tips that a suspect is in
possession of illegal substances or firearms, then show how the
Supreme Court applied that precedent in Navarette. It will then trace
the development of Illinois law on this issue prior to Navarette and
explain how Illinois courts applied precedent developed in the context
of anonymous tips of contraband in the significantly different factual
setting of an anonymous tip of drunk driving. It will conclude by
attempting to define the parameters of tips that are sufficiently reliable
to support an investigatory stop for suspicion of drunk driving under

23. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21–22,
Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014) (“These collective efforts would be
undermined by a rule requiring that before an investigatory stop, officers must observe a suspect
repeat the dangerous conduct that elicited the citizen’s report in the first place.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that “where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot” he is entitled to a search of the suspect).
26. See infra notes 142–95 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts weighed
reasonable suspicion in drunk-driving settings).
27. See cases cited infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
28. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990) (holding that DUI
checkpoints are permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the great danger to public
safety presented by drunk driving greatly outweighs the slight intrusion on the privacy of
motorists who are stopped at DUI checkpoints); People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885–86, 889
(Ill. 1985) (noting the extreme danger to public safety posed by drunk driving and holding that no
probable cause or individualized suspicion is required for a DUI roadblock checkpoint).
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Illinois law and the Navarette decision.
I. DISCUSSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF ANONYMOUS TIPS
AND TERRY STOPS
A. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.”29 Similarly, article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
provides: “The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means.”30 It is well established that
vehicle stops constitute “seizures” of “persons.”31 The operative legal
standard, derived from Terry v. Ohio,32 is familiar: police need only
have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be
committed to make an investigatory stop.33 The Illinois Supreme Court
has explained in detail the Terry standard in the context of an auto stop:
Under Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop
of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has
committed, or is about to, commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22;
People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799 (2003); People v. Thomas, 759
N.E.2d 899 (2001).
The investigatory stop must be justified at its inception. Terry, 392
U.S. at 19–20. “[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21. The officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an
inarticulate hunch, (Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799),
but need not rise to the level of suspicion required for probable cause,
(United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). In judging the police
officer’s conduct, we apply an objective standard: “would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was

29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also People v. Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ill. 2008)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution to apply to the states).
30. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
31. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 256–57 (2007); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024,
1029 (Ill. 2003) (finding that vehicle stops raise Fourth Amendment concerns).
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. Id. at 39.
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appropriate?” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; accord Thomas, 759 N.E.2d
899.
The Terry standards have been codified in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107–14 (West 2006)), and we apply
the same standards in determining the propriety of investigatory stops
under article I, section 6, of our state constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 6). Thomas, 759 N.E.2d 899; see also People v. Caballes, 850
N.E.2d 26 (2006) (reaffirming court’s position that the search and
seizure clause of our state constitution should be interpreted in limited
lockstep with the search and seizure clause of the federal
constitution).34

An officer’s decision to make an investigatory stop is “a practical one
based on the totality of the circumstances.”35 Under the totality of the
circumstances approach, a deficiency in one element can be made up by
the strength of another.36
An officer may initiate a Terry stop based on information provided
by a third party if the information is reliable and “allows an officer to
reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.”37 A
reviewing court “should consider the informant’s veracity, reliability,
and basis of knowledge”38 and must be aware that “one simple rule will
not cover every situation” because “tips may vary greatly in their value
and reliability.”39 Thus, courts may give greater weight to information
provided by an eyewitness or victim of a crime, as opposed to a
participant in the crime or someone with inside knowledge of the
criminal scheme.40 However, even a tip provided by a citizeninformant may be unreliable if it is based only on “speculative
observations” or “subjective fears.”41 Even a description of a suspect in

34. People v. Close, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467–68 (Ill. 2010).
35. People v. Sanders, 986 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (quoting People v. Harris, 957
N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. People v. Yarber, 663 N.E.2d 1131, 1135–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
37. People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 362–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting People v. Jackson
810 N.E.2d 542, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
39. People v. Allen, 950 N.E.2d 1164, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing In re J.J., 539 N.E.2d
764, 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
40. Jackson, 810 N.E.2d at 554; see People v. Matous, 886 N.E.2d 1278, 1285–86 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) (finding that a pharmacist’s tip to police that two men had separately purchased
pseudoephedrine, a chemical used to make methamphetamine, and left together, raised reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop, in part because pharmacist was a concerned citizen who was
acting against his economic interest by informing on his customers).
41. See People v. Ertl, 686 N.E.2d 738, 741–42, 746–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that a
caller’s report that her ex-husband was banging on the door did not justify a Terry stop, although
the ex-husband was known to own guns and had threatened the caller in the past, where the caller
had no idea whether the ex-husband was carrying a gun as he banged on her door, and where he
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a police radio bulletin does not justify a Terry stop without a showing
that the police who issued the bulletin possessed facts that would have
warranted the stop.42 The test is always one of the reasonableness of
the officer’s conduct in the totality of the circumstances.43
B. United States Supreme Court Decisions on Terry Stops Based on
Anonymous Tips
For the better part of the last fifteen years, lower courts have based
their assessments of whether an anonymous tip is reliable enough to
give a police officer reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop44 on
two Supreme Court cases, one of which held that a Terry stop was
justified under the circumstances,45 the other that it was not.46
In Alabama v. White,47 the police received an anonymous tip that a
named woman (the defendant Vanessa White) in possession of an ounce
of cocaine would leave an apartment building at a particular time in a
brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight and drive to
a named motel, approximately four miles away, via a circuitous route

made no threats at that time).
42. People v. Lawson, 700 N.E.2d 125, 130–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citing United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985)). Incidentally, although this factual setting may seem
somewhat remote from the question of the reliability of an anonymous tip of drunk or reckless
driving, it was a topic of intense discussion at oral argument in Navarette v. California. When
Justice Breyer asked counsel for the respondent to cite another case that had held that a thirdparty report of a crime provided an investigating officer with reasonable suspicion, counsel cited
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), in which the Court held that police officers who
receive a police bulletin informing them that a person is wanted on reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts of having committed a felony—but not necessarily a misdemeanor—should be
able to stop that person and investigate that suspicion. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35,
Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014). When Justices Kennedy and
Sotomayor pointed out that Hensley did not involve an anonymous tip, counsel responded that
Hensley was nevertheless relevant and important to the Court’s decision because it distinguished
between felonies and misdemeanors based on the seriousness of the crime and the danger to
public safety that it presents in determining, in the totality of the circumstances, that the
reasonable suspicion standard was met. Id. at 35–36.
43. People v. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d 375, 384 (Ill. 1998), abrogated by People v. Sorenson,
752 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. 2001).
44. See, e.g., People v. Lampitok, 798 N.E.2d 91, 106–09 (Ill. 2003) (relying on White to
determine that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the search at its inception); People v.
Snyder, 904 N.E.2d 625, 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that a stop was justified because of the
officers’ conduct and reasonable belief that the defendant was involved in a more serious crime
than a routine traffic offense); People v. Brown, 798 N.E.2d 800, 809–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(finding a stop not justified through an anonymous informant’s tip because it was uncorroborated
and lacked the requisite indicia of reliability).
45. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
46. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000).
47. 496 U.S. 325.
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involving numerous twists and turns.48 Police observed a woman exit
the specified apartment building, get into the specified car, and drive
toward the named motel.49 An officer stopped the woman just before
she reached the motel, and police found a significant amount of
marijuana and three milligrams of cocaine in her possession.50
The Supreme Court held that while this was a “close case,”51 under
the totality of the circumstances the Terry stop was justified because
“independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the
informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other
allegations made by the caller.”52 Police were reasonable in believing
that, because the informer53 had access to information about the
defendant’s itinerary—information the general public would not have
possessed—the informer may also have had information about illegal
activities in which the defendant was involved.54 The informer gave
police “reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that
he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.”55
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, authored a
dissenting opinion, reasoning that it did not follow from the fact that the
informer knew defendant’s itinerary that the informer knew that
defendant possessed illegal drugs.56 As Justice Stevens explained,
“[a]nybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her
the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be
able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa
White’s excursion.”57
In its decision in Florida v. J.L.,58 the Supreme Court distinguished
White and required additional indicia of reliability besides the
corroboration of innocent, rather than inculpatory, details.59 In J.L., an
48. Id. at 327.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 326–27.
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id. at 331–32.
53. In the cases cited in this Article, courts use the various terms “informer,” “informant,”
“caller,” “tipster,” and “complainant” to refer generally to a person who informs law enforcement
authorities of wrongdoing. In this Article, we use these terms interchangeably, as the cases do,
and the reader should understand them all to have the same meaning. While “informant” may
connote a known, not anonymous, informer, we will use the phrase “known informant” where
that meaning is intended.
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
59. Id. at 272 (requiring anonymous tip to be reliable in assertion of illegality in addition to
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anonymous caller reported that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.60
When officers found a young black male wearing a plaid shirt at that
particular bus stop, they stopped and frisked the young man and found a
gun, although they did not see a gun and had no reason for suspicion
other than the tip.61 However, the Supreme Court held that the tip did
not contain sufficient indicia of reliability to support the frisk, as the
caller provided no predictive information, unlike in White, and the
authorities had no means at all of testing the caller’s knowledge or
credibility.62 The caller never explained how he knew that the
defendant was carrying a gun or provided any basis for believing that he
had inside information.63 The fact that there was actually a person
fitting the description given by the caller at the location specified by the
caller, unlike the fact that the caller in White correctly predicted the
defendant’s future conduct, did not alone make the tip sufficiently
reliable to give police reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct that
would support a Terry stop and frisk.64
The government argued, however, that the standard analysis should
be modified where the tip involves possession of an illegal firearm, as a
person in possession of a firearm presents a serious danger to the
public.65 The Court held that such an exception would simply go too
far, as it would “enable any person seeking to harass another to set in
motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person
simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s
unlawful carriage of a gun.”66 Further, the exception could end up
swallowing the rule. For example, courts had already frequently found
that it was per se foreseeable that a person carrying large amounts of
narcotics was also carrying a gun; 67 thus, if the Court permitted a
firearm exception, lower courts might begin to hold that a dubious tip
identification of a determinate person).
60. Id. at 268.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 271 (holding that lack of predictive information gave police no means of testing
informant’s knowledge or credibility).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 271–72.
65. Id. at 272 (rejecting proposed “firearm exception” to Terry analysis); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993), 1999
WL 1259993, at *18 (proposing justification for a stop and frisk where anonymous tip reports
presence of a firearm).
66. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
67. See id. at 273 (citing United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490 n.20 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 959
(6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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that a person was carrying a large amount of narcotics could justify a
Terry frisk based on the likelihood that the person was also carrying a
firearm.68
The Court further stated that while there may be
circumstances, such as where an informer alleges that a person is
carrying a bomb, in which “the danger alleged in an anonymous tip
might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of
reliability,” or upon a lesser showing of reliability, the facts of J.L. did
not require the Court to rule on the issue.69
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy discussed the limits of the
decision, stating that the Court’s decision was correct “[o]n the record
created at the suppression hearing,” but that “there are many indicia of
reliability respecting anonymous tips that we have yet to explore in our
cases.”70 Justice Kennedy observed that the testimony showed that “an
anonymous tip came in by a telephone call and nothing more” and that
“[t]he record does not show whether some notation or other
documentation of the call was made either by a voice recording or
tracing the call to a telephone number.”71 In general, a tip might be
“anonymous in some sense” but have “certain other features” which
support its reliability—as in White, where the tipster’s correct prediction
of the suspect’s future behavior supported the tip’s reliability.72
For instance, “the ability of police to trace the identity of anonymous
telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability to what,
years earlier, might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips.”73
With the aid of modern technology, a squad car can be sent “within
seconds to the location of the telephone used by the informant.”74
Police are able to hold even an “anonymous” informant responsible for
false information if they are able to trace the anonymous phone call he
made.
An “anonymous” tip may also be reliable under J.L. if the same
tipster, even if he never gave his name or even showed his face but is
identifiable by the sound of his voice, has given reliable information in
previous investigations.75 Yet another factor is whether the informant
68. Id. (holding that, if officers may conduct Terry frisks based on “bare-boned” firearm tips,
it would be reasonable to also permit frisks based on bare-boned narcotics tips).
69. Id. at 273–74.
70. Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 275.
72. See id. (discussing how a tip may provide lawful basis for a police action); Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990) (holding that police verification of predictions made by
anonymous tip made the tip more reliable).
73. J.L., 529 U.S. at 276.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 275.

BURNS AND CONTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/30/2014 9:41 AM

Anonymous Tips

1155

places his “anonymity at risk”—for example, if a person gives a tip of
ongoing criminal activity to an officer in a face-to-face conversation,
rather than over the telephone, then the tip may be sufficiently reliable
to justify police action even if the officer fails to get the informer’s
name.76
Thus, J.L. set limits on the discretion of law enforcement to rely on
anonymous tips to conduct investigatory stops, but it left law
enforcement significant flexibility to conduct investigatory stops based
on anonymous tips either where there are additional indicia of reliability
or where the potential harm is very great.
Courts nationwide have considered how White and J.L. apply to cases
involving anonymous tips of drunk driving, with differing results.77
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, described the split of
authority on the issue in a dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in
Virginia v. Harris.78 In that case, the Commonwealth of Virginia
sought review of a Virginia Supreme Court decision holding that an
officer could not perform an investigatory stop of a suspected drunk
driver, based only on an anonymous tip, until he actually saw the driver
do something unsafe on the road.79 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote that he was “not sure that the Fourth Amendment requires such
independent corroboration before the police can act, at least in the
special context of anonymous tips reporting drunk driving.”80
The Chief Justice took note of the language in J.L. that suggested that
the Fourth Amendment analysis might be different in “circumstances
under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great
as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability,” or where
the “reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is
diminished.”81 Based on this language and the indisputable fact that
drunk driving presents an imminent risk of serious harm, the Chief
Justice wrote that “it is not clear that J.L. applies to anonymous tips
reporting drunk or erratic driving.”82
Chief Justice Roberts went on to explain that, among lower courts

76. Id. at 276 (citing United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978)).
77. See infra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
78. 558 U.S. 978, 979 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
79. Id. at 978–79 (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146–47 (Va. 2008)).
80. Id. at 979.
81. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. (citing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)) (“No one can
seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in
eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are
legion.”); see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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that have considered this question, the majority view has been that
police are not required to corroborate an anonymous tip before making
an investigatory stop.83 A minority of lower courts has held, along with
Harris, that an arresting officer must confirm an anonymous tip by
personally observing impaired or erratic driving before making an
investigatory stop.84 The Chief Justice concluded that the Supreme
Court should weigh in on the issue because “police should have every
legitimate tool at their disposal for getting drunk drivers off the road,”
and only the Supreme Court could decide once and for all whether
unverified anonymous tips are one such tool.85
In Navarette v. California,86 the Supreme Court finally addressed this
question directly, holding that an uncorroborated anonymous tip may be
sufficient to justify a Terry stop if it has adequate indicia of reliability
for the officer to credit the caller’s account and the content of the tip
gives the officer reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As we will
explain more fully in Part I.0 below, the Court reasoned that the tip in
Navarette was reliable because (1) the caller demonstrated that she had
personally observed the conduct she was reporting, (2) the call was
made within a very short time of the incident and thus there was little
time to fabricate the report, and (3) the caller used the 911 system to
deliver the tip, putting herself at risk of being tracked and held
accountable for false reporting. Further, the content of the tip provided
reasonable suspicion of drunk driving because the reckless driving
described by the caller was of the sort that an “objectively reasonable
police officer” would recognize as bearing “sound indicia of drunk
driving.”87
83. Harris, 588 U.S. at 980 (citing United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001);
People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004);
State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001);
State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); State v.
Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); State v. Rutzinski,
623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001)); see also Cottrell v. State, 971 So. 2d 735, 745–46 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2006); State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1118 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Hanning, 296
S.W.3d 44, 54 (Tenn. 2009).
84. Harris, 588 U.S. at 981 (citing State v. Sparen, No. CR00258199S, 2001 WL 206078
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2001); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999)); see also State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d
202, 211 (Iowa 2013); State v. Lee, 938 P.2d 637, 640 (Mont. 1997); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d
638, 644–45 (N.D. 1994); Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008).
85. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 at 980–81 (noting “sharp disagreement” among federal and state
courts as to application of J.L.’s general rule, concluding that “[t]he conflict is clear and the
stakes are high”).
86. No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014); see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; infra Part
I.0.
87. Navarette, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 8.
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For years prior to Navarette, however, Illinois courts had to fend for
themselves in addressing this issue. As the following discussion will
show, Navarette answered many questions raised by the decisions of
courts facing the issue of whether an anonymous tip can raise
reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, but it left others unanswered.
C. Ledesma and Early Interpretations of J.L. and White by Illinois
Courts
In the immediate aftermath of J.L., Illinois courts were inclined to
adhere to the decision closely. In People v. Carlson,88 the Illinois
Appellate Court held that J.L. required that an officer performing a
Terry stop and frisk know the basis for the informer’s knowledge of the
defendant’s illegal conduct.89 An officer received word from a 911
dispatcher that a caller had reported that a possibly suicidal man named
Edward was carrying a gun and speaking with his girlfriend on a pay
phone at a specified location.90 At that location, the officer indeed
found a man on a pay phone fitting the description the caller had given
and answering to the name Edward.91 Upon confirming that the man’s
name was Edward, the officer drew his weapon, commanded the man to
lie prone, and then asked if the man had a weapon92 The man did not
have a gun on his person, but he told the officer that there was a gun in
his vehicle.93
The court held that, under J.L., the prosecution had failed to “present
evidence of sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop and
frisk.”94 While the State asserted that the call was not anonymous, as
the arresting officer reported that the defendant’s girlfriend had made a
911 emergency call to report the defendant, the court found that the
record supported no such assertion.95 The 911 dispatcher told the
officer that there had been a report of a man speaking with his girlfriend
on a pay phone, but the dispatcher did not reveal, and, as far as the
record showed, did not know, who had reported the man.96 The court
reasoned that it must assume that the tip was anonymous, as there was
88. 729 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
89. Id. at 860 (characterizing J.L. as requiring that police must have basis on which to test
anonymous tipper’s knowledge).
90. Id. at 859.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 860.
95. Id. (noting that officer made no statement as to his knowledge of the caller).
96. Id. (finding no evidence as to who actually made the call, ability to trace the call, or a
recording of the call).
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no evidence in the record that the police “knew the identity of the caller
or whether the police could find the caller’s phone number or
address.”97 As such, the case was controlled by J.L. because, just as in
J.L., the stop and frisk was based on an anonymous tip that was no more
than “[a]n accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location
and appearance,” without any guarantee that the tip was “reliable in its
assertion of illegality, not just its tendency to identify a determinate
person.”98
Similarly, in People v. Sparks,99 the Illinois Appellate Court held,
based on J.L., that information provided by a known but confidential
informant that a particular car was carrying drugs is insufficient to
support a Terry stop unless the State shows that the informant was able
to provide more than “innocent” details of a suspect. The informant in
Sparks gave authorities the “defendants’ names; the make, model, color,
and license plate number of [a defendant’s] car; their race; from where
they were traveling; and the day and approximate time that they would
be coming through Springfield” on Interstate 55.100 However, the State
insisted on keeping the informant confidential and provided no
information as to how the informant knew that the defendants were
transporting drugs.101 Further, the police officers involved had never
worked with the informant before and could not vouch for his
reliability.102 Under these circumstances, the court treated the tip as
anonymous and held that something more than corroboration of the tip
in innocent details was needed to raise reasonable suspicion that would

97. Id.
98. Id. at 859–60 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. 734 N.E.2d 216, 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. As the dissenting Justice in Sparks pointed out, the facts of Sparks are exceedingly
similar to those of White. Id. at 226 (McCullough, J., dissenting) (“J.L. also supports a finding
that the search was proper.”). Importantly, J.L. explicitly did not overrule White; on the contrary,
it held that “an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in . . . White
does not justify a stop and frisk.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 274) (internal
quotation marks omitted).Considering the factual similarity between White and Sparks, it is
difficult to understand why the court deemed J.L., not White, to control the case. One possibility
is that the Sparks court decided to affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion
to suppress because it disapproved of the State’s decision to cast the case in terms of the Terry
stop-and-frisk doctrine instead of probable cause in order to avoid having to disclose the identity
of the confidential informant. By arguing that even if the tip had been fully anonymous, a Terry
stop would have been justified, the State did not have to meet the higher threshold for probable
cause. The concurring Justice stated that in this respect the State “wants the best of both worlds
in this case.” Id. at 223 (Cook, P.J., specially concurring).
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justify stopping and searching the defendants’ car.103
Perhaps fearing that Illinois courts were too heavily influenced by
J.L. in deciding these cases, the Illinois Supreme Court weighed in on
the issue in People v. Ledesma104 and followed White, not J.L. In
Ledesma, an anonymous 911 caller reported that he had overheard on
his police scanner talk of a drug deal that would take place soon after in
the parking lot of a particular Aldi store in Tilton, Illinois.105
According to the caller, one of the vehicles involved would be tealcolored.106 A 911 dispatcher relayed the tip to police officers, who
positioned themselves in a parking lot across from the Aldi store.107
The officers saw a maroon automobile drive into the Aldi lot and then
into the parking lot of an adjacent gas station and park next to a teal
vehicle.108 The cars turned off their headlights and remained parked
next to each other for a short time.109 The vehicles then left the gas
station simultaneously and drove off together.110 Police pulled over
both vehicles and, with the assistance of a narcotics detection canine,
found more than 2200 grams of cannabis in the teal vehicle.111 After
the driver of the maroon vehicle was arrested for driving on a revoked
license, police found $5000 in cash in his vehicle.112
The Ledesma court discussed not only White and J.L. but also two
Illinois Appellate Court cases that predated those decisions, People v.
Messamore113 and People v. Moraca.114 In Messamore, the court held
that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop
based only on an anonymous caller’s tip that a suspicious vehicle,
identified only as a dark-green or blue Oldsmobile, was in the area,
where the caller did not describe any suspicious activity other than that
the car had been circling the area for half an hour.115 Similarly, in
Moraca, the court held that an anonymous tip provided to CATCH
(“Catch A Thief With Citizen’s Help”), a program under which phone

103. Id. (majority opinion).
104. 795 N.E.2d 253, 266 (Ill. 2003), overruled on other grounds by People v. Pitman, 813
N.E.2d 93, 101 (Ill. 2004).
105. Id. at 256.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 257.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 615 N.E.2d 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
114. 464 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
115. Messamore, 615 N.E.2d at 763–64.

BURNS AND CONTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1160

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2014 9:41 AM

[Vol. 45

operators took calls from the public regarding criminal activity and
relayed the information to police, was an insufficient basis for
reasonable suspicion under Terry.116 The tipster stated only that a
named individual who drove a blue van with a given license plate
number in a particular neighborhood in Elgin, Illinois, possessed a
handgun in a black pouch and cannabis in a green bag, without stating
how he knew this information.117
The Ledesma court distinguished Messamore and Moraca, explaining
that the tips in those cases provided no information that could be
corroborated to establish the informer’s credibility before officers
proceeded with a Terry stop.118 “[A]n anonymous tip that merely
provides the static details of a suspect’s life along with an allegation of
criminal conduct” cannot support a Terry stop.119 Such a tip is different
from the tip in Ledesma itself, which stated that a person or persons in a
teal car would participate in a drug deal at a particular location.120 As
the officers observed, a maroon car pulled up to a teal car at that
location, and then, after a moment, the two cars drove away together. 121
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the tip that a drug deal would
occur was partially corroborated by the officers’ personal observation of
conduct consistent with a drug deal at the location described by the
tipster and involving a car described by the tipster, and that under these
circumstances White compelled the conclusion that there was
reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop.122
The Illinois Appellate Court later extended Ledesma to the drunk
driving context in Village of Mundelein v. Thompson.123 In Thompson,
a 911 caller reported that he was “following a guy in a van who
seem[ed] to be drunk” and who was “all over the road.”124 The
dispatcher, while still on the line with the caller, relayed the message to
116. Moraca, 464 N.E.2d at 313 (holding that an uncorroborated tip, standing alone,
constitutes insufficient grounds for a Terry stop).
117. Id. at 316.
118. People v. Ledesma, 795 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ill. 2003) (distinguishing Messamore and
Moraca on the grounds that in neither of them did officers observe activity providing indicia of
reliability for the tip), overruled on other grounds by People v. Pitman, 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (Ill.
2004).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 256 (describing the tip); id. at 266–67 (describing tip as specifically identifying
location of, and one vehicle involved in, illegal activity).
121. Id. at 257.
122. Id. at 266–67; c.f. People v. Brown, 798 N.E.2d 800, 803–805, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(distinguishing White and Ledesma under facts similar to those of Sparks because there was no
predictive information that police could corroborate).
123. 793 N.E.2d 996 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
124. Id. at 998.
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Mundelein police.125 The caller then gave the 911 dispatcher his name
and address and watched as police stopped the defendant’s van.126
The court held that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the van
based on the caller’s tip.127 While the caller followed the van and spoke
with the 911 operator, he described the location of the van in relation to
landmarks such as a Family Video store,128 and police actually found
the van where the caller indicated it would be, giving rise to the
inference that the caller was indeed presently witnessing the defendant’s
impaired driving when he called 911.129 The court reasoned that under
these circumstances the tip was more likely to be reliable:
A strong inference that a person is a direct witness to the offense is
more indicative of reliability than a weak inference of some source of
inside information. Further, an informant who is almost surely a
fellow motorist, and thus a chance witness, is much less likely to have
a malicious hidden agenda than an informant with a source of inside
information.130

Thus, even though police had corroborated only details of the tip that
may have had an innocent explanation, not the allegations of illegal
conduct, they could nevertheless rely on the tip under White.
Additionally, the caller in Thompson did not remain anonymous.131
As soon as it was clear to the 911 operator that the police had located
the suspect vehicle, the operator asked the caller for his name and
address, and the caller provided them.132 Because the caller was not
anonymous, the need to corroborate the tip before acting on it was less
acute.133
However, in Village of Mundelein v. Minx,134 the Illinois Appellate
Court rendered a different decision under very similar facts. A motorist
called the Mundelein police department from a cell phone to report that
the car in front of him was “driving recklessly.”135 The motorist
remained behind the car until a police officer arrived and followed the
suspect vehicle.136 The officer did not notice any erratic driving.137
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 998–99.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1003–04.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
815 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 968.
Id. at 968–69.
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The officer drove past the caller’s car in order to follow the suspect
vehicle, but he did not know the caller’s identity and did not speak with
him.138
The court noted that a number of factors militated in favor of the
reliability of the anonymous tip in this case: “the citizen-informant
witnessed a crime by happenstance, reported the crime, did nothing to
conceal his identity and, in fact, indicated he would sign a complaint,
and followed defendant’s vehicle until the officer arrived, thereby
exposing his identity.”139 However, the court held that the caller’s
report was not sufficiently detailed to support a Terry stop, as “the caller
simply reported that defendant was ‘driving recklessly,’ without
indicating what observations led him to this conclusion, e.g., whether
defendant was speeding, running red lights, weaving between lanes, etc.
This information did not provide the specificity necessary to justify an
investigatory stop.”140 The court concluded that
[w]hile the motorist-informant here had a greater degree of reliability
than [a] completely anonymous informant . . . , the additional
reliability did not adequately compensate for either the lack of detail
in his complaint or the absence of a police officer’s observation of
corroborating behavior. . . . [T]he totality of information was simply
insufficient to give [the officer] reasonable suspicion that defendant
was guilty of a crime.141

Thus, in the aftermath of Ledesma, the determination of whether a
citizen’s report of drunk driving was reliable enough to support a Terry
stop turned on whether (1) the tip was anonymous or whether the tipster
had exposed his identity, (2) the informer provided sufficient factual
detail to credibly demonstrate personal knowledge of wrongdoing, and
(3) police were able to corroborate any or all of the factual details
provided by the informer.

137. Id. at 969.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 971.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 972; c.f. People v. DiPace, 818 N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that a
tip from concerned citizens regarding a drunk driver could support a Terry stop where (1) the
informers personally witnessed and specifically described the defendant’s erratic driving, both
over the phone to a police dispatcher and in person to the arresting officer before he made the
arrest; (2) the informers provided the license number of the suspect vehicle; and (3) the informers
provided their names and contact information to police).
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D. The Shafer Decision: Anonymity, Specificity, and the Threat of
Drunk Driving
142
In People v. Shafer,
the Illinois Appellate Court significantly
refined the analysis of Terry stops based on anonymous tips of drunk
driving that it had developed after Ledesma. In Shafer, a police officer
received information from a police dispatcher that an employee at a
Wendy’s restaurant had called to report that an intoxicated person had
caused a disturbance while ordering food at the restaurant’s drive-thru
window.143 Without further information, the officer proceeded quickly
to the only Wendy’s restaurant in the area and saw a car leaving the
Wendy’s parking lot as he arrived.144 The officer activated his
overhead lights, stopped the car immediately, and told the driver that he
was reported to have caused a disturbance at Wendy’s.145 The driver
spoke indistinctly and smelled of alcohol.146 The officer arrested him
for DUI.147
Justice Steigmann, writing for a panel of the Illinois Appellate
Court’s Fourth District, treated the issue more broadly and
comprehensively than the Illinois Appellate Court has done before or
since, reviewing numerous cases from other jurisdictions for persuasive
authority. The court found persuasive, in particular, a list of factors
used by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v. Sousa148 to
determine whether anonymous tips about motorists give rise to
reasonable suspicion:
First, whether there is a “sufficient quantity of information” such as
the vehicle’s make, model, license plate number, location and bearing,
and “similar innocent details” so that the officer may be certain that
the vehicle stopped is the one the tipster identified. Second, the time
interval between the police receiving the tip and the police locating the
suspect vehicle.
Third, whether the tip is based upon
contemporaneous eyewitness observations. Fourth, whether the tip is
sufficiently detailed to permit the reasonable inference that the tipster
has actually witnessed an ongoing motor vehicle offense.149

142. 868 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
143. Id. at 361.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004).
149. Id. (internal citations omitted). In Sousa, an anonymous tipster called a local police
department to report a blue pickup truck with Massachusetts plate number 9557FO who was “all
over the road” and was heading south on Everett Turnpike at Exit 6. The report was forwarded to
the New Hampshire State Police, and a dispatcher told a state trooper in the area of a report of
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The Illinois Appellate Court also held, citing and discussing
numerous decisions of other states, that an “anonymous” tip made via
911 is not really anonymous at all because a 911 caller, even if he does
not give his name, puts his anonymity at risk. 150 The police maintain
records of 911 which they can use to investigate false reports,151 they
can send squad cars to the location of the telephone used by the
informant “within seconds” if false anonymous tips become a recurring
problem, and the ability to trace the identity of anonymous telephone
informants with the aid of modern technology may be a factor which
“lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered
unreliable anonymous tips.”152 Further, again citing numerous cases
from other jurisdictions, the court stated that “a less rigorous
corroboration of tips is needed when the tip concerns a suspected drunk
driver” because a drunk driver is a serious present threat to public safety
that cannot be thwarted by means other than a Terry stop.153 Justice
“erratic op” going southbound from Exit 6. He relayed the license plate number and a description
of the vehicle, a blue Ford pickup from Lowell, Massachusetts. The trooper confirmed this
information by running a license check on the vehicle. The trooper located the vehicle near Exit
2 and pulled it over, without noticing any erratic driving. Id. at 1285.The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire explained that it had previously held in State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338 (N.H. 1995),
that an anonymous tip could provide reasonable suspicion to support stopping a potentially drunk
driver, but it determined that it should reexamine this precedent in light of J.L. The court noted
that while some intermediate state courts had found anonymous tips of drunk driving unreliable,
“every state court of last resort that has directly addressed the issue [since J.L.] has concluded
that, in a drunk or erratic driving case, certain tips are sufficiently reliable and detailed, in the
totality of the circumstances, to establish reasonable suspicion.” Sousa, 855 A.2d at 1288
(emphasis in original). Parenthetically, we note that the court’s statement is no longer true in
light of Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008). Additionally, although Sousa
cited State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001), the Iowa Supreme Court has recently
returned to the issue and held that anonymous tips of drunk driving are not sufficiently reliable to
justify a Terry stop if they are based on the tipster’s personal observation of the driver’s
drunkenness but not his impaired driving. See State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 210–11 (Iowa
2013).The Sousa court discussed, as exemplars of the majority position, the decisions in State v.
Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000) and United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001), and, as
exemplars of the minority position, State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994) and State v. Lee,
938 P.2d 637 (Mont. 1997). Based on these cases, it distilled the governing principles cited in
Shafer and quoted above in the body of this Article. The court did not apply its analytical
framework to the facts of the case before it, however, deciding instead to remand the case to the
trial court because “the application of the test involves a fact-intensive inquiry” that it should not
conduct where the record had not been developed to meet that particular test. Sousa, 855 A.2d at
1291.
150. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 364–65; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
151. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 364 (quoting State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 367–68 (N.J. 2003)).
152. Id. (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 365 (citing Wheat, 278 F. 3d at 732 n.8; State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 85, 864 (Kan.
1994); State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 226, 343 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d
516, 521 (Wis. 2001)).
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Steigmann quoted the language of the Vermont Supreme Court in State
v. Boyea, which stated as follows:
In contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an
anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway
presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly
greater urgency for prompt action. In the case of a concealed gun, the
possession itself might be legal, and the police could, in any event,
surreptitiously observe the individual for a reasonable period of time
without running the risk of death or injury with every passing
moment. An officer in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a
freeway does not enjoy such a luxury. Indeed, a drunk driver is not at
all unlike a “bomb,” and a mobile one at that.154

Regarding the tip in the case before it, the Shafer court stated that it
was made to a 911 emergency number, and it was, therefore, not truly
anonymous and should not be viewed with the skepticism with which
courts treat information provided by anonymous or confidential
informants.155 Further, the court applied the Sousa factors and
determined that all four factors weighed in favor of concluding that the
tip was reliable.156 Finally, it rejected the defendant’s contention that
the tip could not justify a Terry stop because it was “conclusory and
uncorroborated,” emphasizing instead that an “informant’s tips
regarding possible incidents of drunk driving require less rigorous
corroboration. . . . DUI is sufficiently dangerous to the public that it
would have been irresponsible for [the investigating officer], having
received the tip, to simply follow defendant’s car and wait for
154. Id. (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867) (internal quotations omitted). This language is, of
course, based on the Supreme Court’s distinction in J.L. of the case before it from a “bomb”
threat. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273–74 (majority opinion) (“We do not say, for example, that a report of
a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”). Although this portion
of the opinion is often cited in cases such as Boyea and others—see, e.g., Golotta, 837 A.2d at
372 (“We find the bomb example to be particularly apt because . . . this Court has previously
described intoxicated motorists as ‘moving time bombs.’” (citation omitted))—some
commentators have pointed out that this language in J.L. is dicta that merely admits that
“extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions,” 529 U.S. at 272, without
necessarily sanctioning a sliding scale requiring substantial corroboration where the danger is low
and proportionately less corroboration as the danger grows more serious. See Melanie D. Wilson,
Since When Is Dicta Enough to Trump Fourth Amendment Rights? The Aftermath of Florida v.
J.L., 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 211, 229 (2005); Chris LaTronica, Comment, Could You? Should
You? Florida v. J.L.: Danger Dicta, Drunken Bombs and the Universe of Anonymity, 85 TULSA L.
REV. 831, 847–48 (2011); see also Brief for Petitioners at 26–27, Navarette v. California, No. 129490 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014) (arguing that “the Court was presumably imagining a report of a
potentially cataclysmic event such as a terrorist attack or similar activity; e.g., the Boston
Marathon bombing,” not drunk driving or any such mundane activity).
155. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 367.
156. Id.
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potentially catastrophic results to occur.”157
The defendant argued that the tip contained no specific details to
support the caller’s opinion that the defendant was intoxicated, and the
court agreed that “the record [was] silent as to just what defendant
did . . . that caused the Wendy’s employee enough concern to call . . .
police.”158 Nevertheless, the court held that it was enough that the
officer knew that the caller was an employee at Wendy’s who stated she
had been in an altercation with an intoxicated driver at a drive-thru
window, where she would have been in “close enough proximity” to
make a “hand-to-hand exchange of food and money.”159 This
information, plus the facts that the officer had enough information to
properly identify the vehicle in question and made the stop very soon
after receiving the tip, was enough to meet the Sousa test.160 The tip
was therefore sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion to
justify a Terry stop.161
By undertaking a detailed, scholarly analysis and placing itself in the
broader context of nationwide opinions on this issue, Shafer marked
itself as a landmark case in Illinois jurisprudence, and subsequent
decisions certainly took note of it. In People v. Ewing, the Illinois
Appellate Court followed Shafer under similar facts.162 The trial court
in Ewing had relied on Minx in holding that a 911 tip from “Melissa
from Crestline [Veterinary Hospital]” that a man leaving the hospital
was intoxicated did not give the officer reasonable suspicion to stop the
defendant, but the appellate court reversed.163 According to the
appellate court, in an opinion authored by Justice Myerscough, one of
the concurring justices in Shafer, Minx was not only distinguishable but
also “simply wrong.”164 Minx was distinguishable because, in that case,
the caller’s belief that the driver was drunk was based on a vague
observation that the defendant was “driving recklessly,” whereas in

157. Id. at 367–68.
158. Id. at 367.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 880 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). Ewing also addressed the additional issue of
whether all the information given to a 911 dispatcher by an anonymous caller could be imputed to
the officers, or whether the 911 dispatcher had to relay enough information to raise in the
arresting officers’ minds reasonable suspicion that would justify a Terry stop. The Ewing court
held, adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit and another federal court in similar cases, that
the knowledge of the 911 dispatcher could be imputed to the officer. Id. at 595 (citing United
States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)).
163. Id. at 591.
164. Id. at 597.
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Ewing the caller had an opportunity to observe the defendant during a
face-to-face, in-person encounter when he dropped off his dog at the
veterinary hospital.165 The Ewing court explained that, like the caller in
Shafer, who had a close personal encounter with the suspect at a drivethru window, the caller was in close enough proximity to the suspect to
be able to notice signs of intoxication.166 Further, the court noted that a
layperson is perfectly competent to determine whether another person is
intoxicated.167 The court held that the tip in Ewing was therefore more
reliable.168
The Illinois Appellate Court further reasoned that Minx was wrong
because, in that case, the caller certainly put his anonymity at risk by
calling on his own cell phone and remaining behind the suspect vehicle
until a Terry stop was made.169 According to the Ewing court, an
officer should not have to wait until he can personally corroborate a
non-anonymous report that a motorist is driving recklessly, thereby
endangering the public, before making a stop.170 Rather, “as noted in
Shafer, an intoxicated driver presents a more imminent danger than
many other crimes—such as concealment of a handgun—and requires
less corroboration of an informant’s tip.”171
The influence of Shafer on Illinois courts is further apparent in
People v. Rollins.172
In another opinion authored by Justice
Myerscough, the appellate court in Rollins strained to follow Shafer
despite important factual differences. In Rollins, an anonymous 911
caller reported that a black man from Chicago was selling drugs from
the trunk of a brown four-door Chevrolet without hubcaps on Fowler
Street in front of Green Meadows apartment complex.173 The arresting
officer, with no further information from the dispatcher, arrived on the
scene and noticed a car matching the caller’s description turning from
Fowler onto an intersecting street.174 The officer initiated a Terry stop
and learned that the driver was from Chicago.175 After receiving
permission to search the car, he found drugs. 176 Applying the Sousa
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 597 (citing People v. Workman, 726 N.E.2d 759, 762–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)).
Id.
Id. at 597–98.
Id.; see People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 365–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597 (citing Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 365).
892 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factors adopted in Shafer and relying in part on Shafer’s holding that
911 calls are not truly anonymous, the Rollins court held that the tip was
sufficiently detailed and reliable to raise reasonable suspicion that
would justify a Terry stop.177
Justice Appleton, who had concurred in Shafer along with Justice
Myerscough, dissented in Rollins, contending that the case was
indistinguishable from J.L. and Sparks.178 As in those cases, the caller
did not state that he saw the man doing anything incriminating or
indicate how he knew that the man was selling drugs; he simply stated
that a man was selling drugs out of the brown Chevrolet. 179 Although
the majority inexplicably insisted that the caller did state that he saw the
man selling drugs,180 the dissent pointed out that the caller made no
such statement, and the majority could only infer from the detailed
report given by the caller that the caller had witnessed the criminal
activity.181 Despite the majority’s attempt to distinguish J.L. on the
basis that it involved concealed criminal activity of which an informer
would need to have inside knowledge, rather than open, ongoing
criminal activity that anyone in the area could see,182 the dissent
177. Id. at 26.
178. Id. at 29 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 27 (majority opinion). This insistence was at odds with the majority’s own
statement of the facts of the case. See id. at 23.
181. Id. at 30 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 26–27 (majority opinion). Although Illinois cases have not turned on this
distinction between concealed criminal activity, as in J.L., and open criminal activity that the
tipster could easily have seen, cases in other jurisdictions have sometimes emphasized it. Where
the tip describes open criminal activity, some courts presume that the tipster personally observed
the conduct, without requiring proof of personal knowledge. For example, although in State v.
Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000), the emergency dispatcher told the arresting officer only that the
suspect vehicle was “operating erratically” at a particular location, and the record did not show
that the tipster had given any other factual details that might show his basis of knowledge, a
concurring opinion stated as follows:
The offense alleged here did not involve a concealed crime—a possessory offense.
What was described in the police dispatch to the arresting officer was a crime in
progress, carried out in public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its
commission. Unlike the tip alleged in White—that White was carrying narcotics— . . .
here a total stranger could have observed defendant’s driving abilities. No intimate or
confidential relationship was required to support the accuracy of the observation. The
caller simply reported a contemporaneous observation of criminal activity taking place
in his line of sight. (Obviously, the caller may have used words other than “erratic
driving” to describe what was observed, and the dispatcher may have reduced the
tipster’s information to police lingo before issuing the BOL.)
Boyea, 765 A.2d at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W. 2d 625 (Iowa 2001), in which the tipster stated that he was following the
suspect vehicle and saw the suspect driving in the median, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that:
This case is different from J.L. in several respects, one of which is particularly
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concluded that J.L. simply permitted no such inference.183
The Fourth District, in an opinion by Justice Steigmann, joined by
Justice Appleton, cleaved to Shafer again in People v. Hansen.184 In
Hansen, a boy and his mother, identifying themselves as Carson and
Pam Smith, called 911 to report that a black truck with a sticker in the
rear window reading “All Types Landscaping” was driving recklessly,
“hot rodding” up and down the street and doing “donuts” in the road.185
Six minutes later, they called back to say that the vehicle had taken off
eastbound on Route 16.186 An officer was dispatched by 911 to
investigate, and he stopped a truck fitting the description given by the
boy and mother heading eastbound on Route 16.187 The driver was
arrested on suspicion of drunk driving.188 The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion to quash arrest, however, reasoning that the mother
and boy had not given sufficient details to raise reasonable suspicion of
drunk driving.189
The appellate court reversed. The court began by summarizing
Shafer and Ewing, pointing out that in both cases the tips were not
anonymous, even though the informers did not give their full names,
because the informers called 911 emergency numbers and gave some
identifying information.190 This discussion is particularly noteworthy
because the court stated that “[i]nformation provided pursuant to an
emergency call is more reliable than other calls.”191 The court thus
appeared to suggest that the fact that the callers had called a 911
emergency number made their tips even more reliable, apart from the
fact that the callers had given their names,192 presumably because it
important: the information provided here did not concern concealed criminal activity,
but rather illegality open to public observation. The tip here demonstrated the tipster’s
basis of knowledge: the caller observed the defendant driving in an erratic manner.
Id. at 627–28. Although the caller refused to give his name and there was no further information
about him or her in the record, the court considered the caller a citizen informant (as opposed to a
confidential informant cooperating with authorities in hopes of receiving leniency for his own
offenses) whose information was therefore presumptively reliable. Id. at 629; c.f. State v.
Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 211–12 (Iowa 2013) (holding that a tip of drunk driving could not
support an investigatory stop where it was clear from the record that the tipster did not actually
see the suspects driving drunk).
183. Rollins, 892 N.E.2d at 29–30 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting).
184. 968 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
185. Id. at 165.
186. Id. at 166.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 167–69.
191. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
192. The Seventh Circuit has questioned whether a 911 call truly deserves to be treated as

BURNS AND CONTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1170

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2014 9:41 AM

[Vol. 45

allowed authorities to trace the call and verify the identity and location
of the callers if they had any reason to doubt that the callers had given
their correct names.193
Further, the court explained that the callers had given sufficiently
specific detail of recklessness in describing the car spinning donuts and
racing up and down the street, that such recklessness raised reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving, and that the tip met all the Sousa factors
adopted in Shafer.194 The suspect vehicle presented an imminent threat
more reliable because the caller puts his anonymity at risk:
Yet as a practical matter a name given by a caller does not make the tip less
anonymous. Suppose that the 911 call in this case had begun: “My name is John
Jenkins, and I would like to report. . .”. That a caller gives a name does not mean that
he is John Jenkins (either the President of Notre Dame or any other John Jenkins).
Caller ID does not solve this problem for public phones or even home phones, which
can be used by multiple people (including guests at a party); some subscribers block
the service. Cell phones, which almost always use caller ID, can be stolen.
United States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (emphasis in
original); see also Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & National
Association of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, 11, Navarette v.
California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014) (arguing that callers may easily frustrate
authorities’ attempts to trace 911 calls, by methods such as using a prepaid cell phone or
“spoofing”). Nevertheless, the Wooden court found that the tip in that case, which reported a man
on the street who had drawn his gun, justified a Terry stop based on the danger to public safety
described:
And it would undermine the goal of the 911 system to require a caller to prove his
identity, perhaps by coming to the station with a driver’s license or passport, before the
police react to the information. When crime is in progress, prompt action is essential.
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and it has long
been understood that, when the police believe that a crime is in progress (or imminent),
action on a lesser degree of probability, or with fewer procedural checks in advance,
can be reasonable . . . . The district court did not err in concluding that the
circumstances reported to the police implied a need for haste, and that a report by a
person claiming to have seen a gun drawn in public provided articulable suspicion for a
Terry stop and frisk.
Wooden, 551 F.3d at 650 (emphasis in original).
193. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 23,
at 16 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.18(f)–(g), which require cellular carriers to transmit data concerning
a caller’s geographic location with every 911 call).
194. Hansen, 968 N.E.2d. at 171. It is noteworthy that in Hansen, the second Sousa factor—
the time interval between the police receiving the tip and the police locating the suspect vehicle—
received some attention. Since the Illinois Appellate Court began using the Sousa factors in
2007, the second Sousa factor has generally been an afterthought, and no cases have turned
significantly on it. In Hansen, however, this factor came into play because the trial court’s
decision was based in part on the reasoning that the six-minute interval between the Smiths’ first
call and their second call, in which Carson Smith stated that the suspect was leaving the area,
indicated that the imminent danger to the public had ceased, and, combined with the fact that
there was a twelve-minute interval between the first call and the Terry stop, the second Sousa
factor weighed against the reasonableness of the stop. The appellate court rejected this reasoning
because, regardless of whether the stop took six minutes or twelve minutes, “the time-interval
was in line with [the] decisions in Shafer and Ewing.” Id. at 172. Further, the appellate court did
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to public safety, and officers were justified in initiating the Terry stop
without independently corroborating the tip.195
E. Distinguishing Shafer: Reliability and Specificity
While Shafer has clearly been influential, the Illinois Appellate Court
has not followed Shafer uncritically. In two recent decisions, it has
affirmed trial courts that have granted motions to quash arrest and
suppress evidence gained from invalid Terry stops based on unreliable
tips. In People v. Smulik, the defendant dined with a female friend at a
restaurant, but he left after he and his friend argued.196 The defendant
then had a drink at a nearby bar.197 After leaving the bar, he pulled into
a gas station, parked his car in a marked parking space, turned off the
engine and smoked a cigarette in his car in order to “cool down a bit”
from the argument.198 A police car then pulled up behind him,
emergency lights flashing.199 The police officer had received a dispatch
regarding “a possible DUI with a complainant following.”200 The
complainant, a female whose name did not appear in the record, had
observed the defendant drinking at both the restaurant and the bar,
believed he was too drunk to drive, and called in his license plate
number, his location, and a description of his vehicle.201
The court stated that there was no evidence in the record showing that
the complainant provided her name or contacted police via an
emergency number. Without any such information, the court held that it

not agree that the interval between the first call and the second call showed that the suspect no
longer presented a threat to the public; to the contrary, the fact that the Smiths felt it necessary to
make a second call indicated that they still judged the suspect to be a threat to the public. Id. at
171–72. Other courts, including the United States Supreme Court in Navarette, have focused not
on the interval between the tip and the police response but on whether the tip and the observation
of erratic driving were essentially “contemporaneous.” See Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490,
slip op. at 6 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014); see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 735 (8th Cir.
2001) (“We think that an anonymous tip conveying a contemporaneous observation of criminal
activity whose innocent details are corroborated is at least as credible as the one in White, where
future criminal activity was predicted, but only innocent details were corroborated.”);
Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1219–20 (Del. 2004) (agreeing with the Wheat court’s
conclusion, and holding the same); State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49–50 (Tenn. 2009)
(holding that an anonymous tip of drunk driving was reliable in significant part because the
offense, the tip, and the officer’s response were all virtually contemporaneous, which tended to
indicate that the tipster had personally witnessed the offense).
195. Hansen, 968 N.E.2d at 171–73.
196. People v. Smulik, 964 N.E.2d 183, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 184–85.
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was bound to treat the tip as an anonymous one, and its reliability
hinged “on the existence of corroborative details observed by the
police,” in which respect the evidence was lacking.202 The court
reasoned that, before making the Terry stop, the officer had been able to
corroborate only “noninculpatory aspects of the tip—that a vehicle
fitting a certain description would be found at a particular location.”203
Under J.L. and White, the officer simply did not have sufficient
information to raise reasonable suspicion that would justify a Terry
stop.
The court questioned whether an informer’s reporting
contemporaneous observations actually improved the reliability of the
tip, pointing out that contemporaneous reports of the movements of a
particular vehicle had no bearing on the veracity of the informer as to
whether the vehicle was being driven erratically. 204 Such information
was no different than the information given in J.L., which did no more
than identify a particular suspect at a particular location.205
The court in Smulik acknowledged that Shafer had held that “the
threat that intoxicated drivers pose to public safety justifies some
relaxation of the corroboration requirement.”206 However, the Smulik
court found that this reasoning was inapposite because the arresting
officer initiated the Terry stop while the suspect vehicle was stopped
with the engine turned off, when the officer could just as easily have
initiated a consensual encounter to corroborate the tip that the suspect
was intoxicated.207
In the most recent decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, the Third
District weighed in on the issue in City of East Peoria v. Palmer.208 In
Palmer, the police received a call from the Par-A-Dice Casino that an
individual had been cut off from drinking and there was a possible
drunk driver leaving the premises.209 The casino gave police a
description of the suspect vehicle and its license plate number and
offered to call back when the individual began to drive away. 210 An
officer pulled into the parking lot of the casino and waited for the

202. Id. at 187.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 188–89 (criticizing State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W. 2d 516, 521 (Wis. 2001)). But see
infra note 228 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 188 n.3.
206. Id. at 188.
207. Id. at 189. Nevertheless, it is a crime to be in “actual physical control” of an automobile
while intoxicated, even if not driving. See infra note 290 (discussing Illinois DUI statute).
208. 980 N.E.2d 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
209. Id. at 777.
210. Id.
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follow-up call.211 However, before he received any such call, the
officer noticed a car matching the casino’s description driving past his
location, not in the parking lot but out on the road in front of the lot, and
he pulled out of the parking lot to follow.212 The suspect vehicle
stopped at a traffic light, but the officer could not see the license plate
number because another car was between his car and the suspect
vehicle.213 The suspect vehicle then crossed the intersection and pulled
into a gas station, and the officer pulled in behind and initiated the Terry
stop.214
The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
officer did not have sufficient information to raise a reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop.215 The casino told the officer that a
dark green Ford SUV, possibly driven by a drunk driver, would be
pulling out of the parking lot soon, and that he would receive another
call when the vehicle left the parking lot; however, the officer never saw
any dark green Ford SUV leave the parking lot, and when he first
noticed a dark green Ford SUV, it was out on the main road, not in the
parking lot or leaving the parking lot.216 The casino had given the
officer the license plate number of the suspect vehicle, but the officer
admitted that he was not available to verify that the license number
matched the one the casino had given until after he initiated the Terry
stop.217 The court recognized that, under Shafer, a tip that there is a
drunk driver on the road is subject to a “less stringent reliability
analysis” in determining whether it provides reasonable suspicion to
justify a Terry stop because drunk driving is an imminent threat to
public safety, but in this case the officer had absolutely no indication
that this was the same dark green Ford SUV that the casino had
described to him when he initiated the Terry stop of the vehicle.218
According to the court, he therefore did not have reasonable suspicion
that the driver of the SUV was drunk.
F. The Navarette Decision
The United States Supreme Court finally rendered a decision on this
issue in Navarette v. California. In Navarette, a 911 caller reported that
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 783–84.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
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she had been run off the road by a silver Ford F150 pickup, and she
provided a license number and the location of the near-accident, mile
marker 88 on southbound Highway 1.219 The caller identified herself,
but neither she nor the 911 dispatcher who received the call testified at
the suppression hearing, and the prosecution, lower courts, and Supreme
Court all treated the tip as anonymous. 220 The 911 dispatcher relayed
the tip to a dispatcher in an adjacent county, who in turn broadcast it to
California Highway Patrol officers.221 Thirteen minutes after hearing
the broadcast tip, a California Highway Patrol officer spotted a truck
fitting the caller’s description at miler marker 69 on southbound
Highway 1.222 Five minutes after that, without having personally
observed any erratic driving, the officer pulled the truck over.223 The
officer smelled marijuana, searched the truck and found thirty pounds of
marijuana within.224
The Supreme Court explained that the Fourth Amendment permits an
investigative stop when there is reasonable suspicion in the totality of
the circumstances, “dependent on both the content of information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability,” that a crime is
occurring.225 While an anonymous tip alone seldom suffices to provide
police with reasonable suspicion, the court confirmed that “under
appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate
‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make
[an] investigatory stop.’”226
The Court first determined that the 911 call was sufficiently reliable.
First, by reporting that she had been run off the road by a vehicle that
she specifically identified, the caller demonstrated that she had personal,
eyewitness knowledge of the suspect’s reckless driving, and personal
knowledge supports a tip’s reliability.227 Second, the record showed,
based on when the tip was made, where the caller said the incident of
reckless driving occurred, what direction the suspect vehicle was
heading, and where the responding officer actually found the suspect
vehicle that the caller was apparently telling the truth about seeing the

219. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014).
220. Id. at 2 n.1.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 1–2.
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 3 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
226. Id. at 4 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)).
227. Id. at 5.
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suspect vehicle heading southbound at mile marker 88 at the time of her
call, and the tip was therefore apparently contemporaneous with the
observation of criminal activity. Just as, in evidence law, present sense
impressions and statements made while the declarant is under stress of
excitement may be treated as especially reliable, the caller’s 911 call,
demonstrably contemporaneous with the observation that prompted it
(unlike the tip in J.L.), should be treated as especially reliable.228 Third,
the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system provided additional indicia
of reliability because 911 callers may be recorded, identified, traced,
and prosecuted for false reporting, and “technological and regulatory
developments” have made it increasingly reasonable to suppose that a
false tipster would “think twice before using such a system,” in fear of
being traced and caught.229
Having determined that the tip was reliable, the Court considered
whether the tip, even if reliable, was sufficient to provide reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving.230 The tip in Navarette did not actually
allege drunk driving or any particular crime; it merely alleged that a
motorist ran the caller off the road. The Court determined that this tip
was sufficient because running another vehicle off the road “suggests
lane positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, or
some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues” which,
along with other behaviors such as weaving across the roadway,
crossing the center line and driving in the median, represent “sound
indicia of drunk driving” that any “reasonable and prudent men” would
recognize.231
The Navarettes contended that running another driver off the road
could be explained by something as innocent as “an unruly child” in the
backseat. However, the Court explained that “reasonable suspicion
need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”232 The
petitioners also contended that any reasonable suspicion that may have
arisen was dispelled by the officer’s following the suspect vehicle for
five minutes without observing any erratic driving. The Court again
disagreed, explaining that five minutes was hardly long enough to dispel
the reasonable suspicion that the tip created, especially considering that
“the appearance of a marked police car would inspire more careful
driving for a time.”233 The Court emphasized that there was no need, in
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 10 (citing People v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
Id. (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275).
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any case, for an officer who had received a reliable tip of drunk driving
to “surveil a vehicle at length in order to personally observe drunk
driving.”234
Rather, once reasonable suspicion arises, “the
reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn
on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.”235
Further, the Court explained, “[t]his would be a particularly
inappropriate context to depart from that settled rule, because allowing a
drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have
disastrous consequences.”236
Thus, the Court quite simply held that the anonymous tip was reliable
and the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Navarettes, even
though he did not personally observe any erratic driving to corroborate
the tip. Notably, the Court did not expressly adopt the reasoning of the
respondent in its briefing and at argument that the great danger to public
safety presented by drunk driving may justify Terry stops, in the totality
of the circumstances, even in situations in which the facts were such
that, in a less dangerous context, the standard for reasonable suspicion
would not be met. It never addressed the “bomb” language in J.L., and,
while it made a faint gesture toward the line of argument based on that
language when it stated, in dicta, that “allowing a drunk driver a second
chance for dangerous conduct could have disastrous consequences,”237
this proposition formed no part of its analysis of whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion in the first place. The Court simply reasoned that
the tip, made via 911 immediately after personally observing the
conduct it reported, provided reliable information that would lead a
reasonable officer to suspect that the motorist it described may be
intoxicated. However, the Court did not expressly reject or repudiate
the respondent’s proffered reasoning based on the danger to public
safety, and it remains unclear whether, in a different case in which the
tip did not have all the indicia of reliability or specificity that the tip in
Navarette had, it might comport with the Fourth Amendment to reason
that a Terry stop was nevertheless justified based in part on the
suspected drunk driver’s potential danger to public safety.

234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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II. ANALYSIS: KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSESSING PROPRIETY OF TERRY
STOPS BASED ON TIPS OF DRUNK DRIVING
Under these principles, the following are key factual issues that
Illinois courts will look to resolve to determine whether a drunk driving
tip provides reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.
A. Is the Tip Truly Anonymous?
The first question is whether and to what degree the tip is
anonymous. A tip given anonymously is less reliable than a tip given
by someone who also gives his name and contact information, and an
anonymous tip therefore requires greater corroboration before police
can act on it by initiating a Terry stop.238 However, as the foregoing
discussion shows, whether courts consider a tip to be anonymous is
actually more complicated than simply whether the tipster gives his
name. Numerous decisions hold that, even if a tipster does not actually
give his name or specifically identify himself, the tip is entitled to no
less reliability if the tipster has placed his anonymity at risk such that
the police could find him and confront him if his information proved to
be false.239 For instance, Shafer explained that 911 calls are not
anonymous at all, even if the caller does not give her full name, because
the police are able to trace 911 calls instantly, and Ewing and Hansen
cited, discussed, and followed Shafer on this point.240 Navarette
238. People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d 216, 221–222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
239. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If an informant
places his anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the
tip.”); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 525 (Wis. 2001) (citing, inter alia, Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (holding that a tip from a known informant, given to a police officer
in a face-to-face conversation, was reliable in part because the informant exposed himself to
arrest by providing information)) (holding that a caller put his anonymity at risk by telling police
that he was in the car in front of the suspect vehicle).
240. Additionally, the penalty in Illinois for making false reports via 911 or to a
police officer is stiff. A person commits the offense of “disorderly conduct” if he
knowingly(4) Transmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner to any peace officer,
public officer or public employee a report to the effect that an offense will be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed, knowing at the time of the
transmission that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the offense will be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed; [or]
....
(6) Calls the number “911” for the purpose of making or transmitting a false alarm
or complaint and reporting information when, at the time the call or transmission is
made, the person knows there is no reasonable ground for making the call or
transmission and further knows that the call or transmission could result in the
emergency response of any public safety agency[.]
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1(a) (2013). A violation of subsection (a)(4) or (a)(6) of the
disorderly conduct statute is a Class 4 felony, id. § 5/26-1(b), punishable by a term of
imprisonment “not less than one year and not more than three years.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/5-
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agreed, citing Federal Communications Commission regulations
requiring phone carriers to transmit information about the call,
including the caller’s geographic location, to 911 dispatchers.241
It may be significant, however, that neither Shafer nor Ewing nor
Hansen involved a phone call that would have been completely
anonymous, even without the ability of modern technology to trace the
call. In both Shafer and Ewing, an employee called police while on the
job, giving the name of her employer, and reported a drunk driver.242 In
Shafer, the caller identified herself as a Wendy’s employee in a town
that had only one Wendy’s restaurant to report an incident that had just
occurred at Wendy’s.243 In Ewing, the caller identified herself as
“Melissa from Crestline,” a veterinary hospital.244 In Hansen, the
callers, a mother and son, both gave their full names, Pam and Carson
Smith of Fieldon, Illinois.245 Thus, the content of all three calls
provided enough information to allow police to trace the call back to the
caller and hold the caller responsible if the information proved false.
No Illinois court has yet held a 911 phone call tip in which the caller did
not identify himself at all, other than by calling 911, to be reliable
without looking for some corroborating factor.
In the wake of Navarette, the need for caution on this point is
somewhat reduced, as Navarette was a case in which the record showed
that the tip was received via 911 but contained no information
identifying the caller. However, where the record does not show even
that the call was made to 911, or that it could be traced back to the caller
in some other way, the call may not be sufficiently reliable to raise
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop without corroboration. For
example, in Smulik, the arresting officer testified only that she received
a dispatch regarding a possible DUI and she initiated a Terry stop.246
Even though the caller was following the suspect as she called police,
the record did not show that she called an emergency number, which
would put her anonymity at risk.247 Further, the record showed that,
4.5-45(a) (2013); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 23, at 17 n.1 (citing statutes in every state criminalizing such false reporting). But see
supra note 194 and accompanying text.
241. See Navarette, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 7 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.18(d)(1), (e)–(h) (2013);
id. §§ 64.1601(b), (d)(4)(ii)).
242. People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d
359, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
243. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 361.
244. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 589.
245. People v. Hansen, 968 N.E.2d 164, 170–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
246. People v. Smulik, 964 N.E.2d 183, 184–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
247. Id.
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although the complainant remained on the scene to speak with police if
necessary, the arresting officer did not speak with her until after
initiating the Terry stop.248 On this record, the court had no choice but
to analyze the stop as if it were a truly anonymous tip by someone who
had not put her anonymity at risk at the time of the stop. Thus, the tip
could only be judged reliable enough to support a Terry stop if the
police observed corroborative details. Because the police observed no
such corroborative details, the evidence fell short.249
In summary, a non-anonymous tip from a citizen informant, unlike an
anonymous tip, need not be viewed with suspicion and requires less
corroboration to justify a Terry stop. A 911 call is not strictly an
“anonymous” tip, even if the caller does not give his name. However,
the State must prove that the informer used an emergency number, gave
his name, or otherwise put his anonymity at risk, even if, as in Smulik, it
seems fair to infer that the tip was made to a 911 number and the caller
did put her anonymity at risk. If the State produces no such evidence,
then it must prove that police had information corroborating inculpatory
248. Id. at 186–87; see Vill. of Mundelein v. Thompson, 793 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (“Only the
facts known to the officer at the time of the seizure can be considered in determining whether the
seizure was proper—information gained after the seizure is made must be disregarded.”). In
Thompson, the defendant argued that the Terry stop was not proper because, although the caller
eventually gave police his name and contact information, he did not do so before the defendant
was stopped. Thompson, 793 N.E.2d at 1003; see supra note 133 and accompanying text. The
court held that the record showed that, although it was close, in fact the caller did give his name
and contact information before the stop occurred, and the court expressly did not decide “whether
such anonymity would have rendered the call unreliable.” Thompson, 793 N.E.2d at
1004.Importantly, if the informant had spoken with the arresting officer in a face-to-face
conversation before the officer initiated the Terry stop, the tip would likely have been deemed
reliable enough to raise reasonable suspicion, even if the informant had not given her name.
Illinois courts sometimes treat anonymous face-to-face, in-person tips to police as more reliable
than telephone tips, reasoning that speaking with a police officer concretely puts one’s anonymity
at risk, even if the officer does not actually ask for a name. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 986
N.E.2d 114, 123–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); People v. Miller, 824 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); People v. DiPace, 818 N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re A.V., 783 N.E.2d 111,
114 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Importantly, however, even face-to-face anonymous tips may not be
reliable enough to support an investigatory stop where there are no other indicia of reliability.
People v. Henderson, 989 N.E.2d 192, 200 (Ill. 2013) (holding that the fact that the arresting
officers received the anonymous tip in person was not enough to distinguish the case from J.L.,
where the cases were otherwise essentially identical); People v. Rhinehart, 961 N.E.2d 933, 938
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding unreliable an anonymous tip given to a police officer in person
where the record did not show (1) whether the tip was based on personal knowledge or (2) the
distance between the location at which the tip was given and the site of the Terry stop).
249. Smulik, 964 N.E.2d at 187; see also People v. Carlson, 729 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (refusing to assume that the suspect’s girlfriend made the call when there was no proof in
the record); supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. But see Vill. of Mundelein v. Minx, 815
N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (treating the tip as non-anonymous because the caller clearly
put his anonymity at risk and indicated he would sign a complaint even though his name and
contact information did not appear in the record).
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details, or had some other strong indicia of reliability, as in White, in
order to survive a motion to suppress evidence gained from the Terry
stop.250
B. How Specific is the Tip? What Factual Details Are Provided?
The reliability of the tip depends on the totality of the circumstances,
not just on whether the tipster gives his name or puts his anonymity at
risk. Even if a tip is not anonymous, “it remains the case that a
minimum of corroboration or other verification of the reliability of the
information is required.”251 Thus, the specificity and level of detail
with which a tip is made are often critical to a court’s decision on a
motion to suppress.
1. Is the Factual Detail Sufficient to Allow Authorities to Identify the
Vehicle?
In Shafer, the Illinois Appellate Court adopted the Sousa factors to
analyze whether a tip is sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop.252
The first Sousa factor is whether there is enough information “such as
the vehicle’s make, model, license plate number, location and bearing,
and ‘similar innocent details’ so that the officer may be certain that the
vehicle stopped is the one the tipster identified.”253 In most Illinois
cases, this factor has weighed in favor of reliability because tipsters
usually give this sort of identifying information.254 Navarette was no
exception—the caller gave the color, make, model, and license number
of the suspect vehicle, and she also provided its bearing and the location
of the observed reckless driving.255
However, where the tipster gives only scant identifying information,
the court may be likely to grant a motion to suppress evidence gained
from the arrest. For example, in Palmer, the arresting officer knew that
a potentially intoxicated driver would soon be leaving the Par-A-Dice

250. See Smulik, 964 N.E.2d at 187 (discussing the reliability of an anonymous tip “hing[ing]
on the existence of corroborative details observed by the police”).
251. Thompson, 793 N.E.2d at 1003, cited in People v. Linley, 903 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009); see infra note 295 and accompanying text; see also People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d 216,
223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (requiring adequate corroboration, and holding that quality, not quantity,
of corroboration is the crucial requirement).
252. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing the Sousa factors applied in
Shafer).
253. People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting State v. Sousa, 855
A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id. at 367 (dismissing the argument that the tip was unreliable in part because the tip was
sufficiently detailed).
255. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014).
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Casino in a dark green Ford SUV, and he stopped a vehicle in the
vicinity of the casino for no reason other than that it was a dark green
Ford SUV.256 In such circumstances, the officer did not have enough
information to be reasonably certain that the vehicle he stopped was the
same vehicle that the casino had reported.257 Thus, the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop, and the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion
to quash arrest.258
2. Is the Factual Detail Sufficient to Support the Inference That the
Tipster Has Actual Knowledge of Wrongdoing?
Courts will scrutinize the level of detail contained in the tip to
determine whether it fairly supports an inference that the tipster actually
saw the conduct he reports. As the appellate court stated in Thompson:
A strong inference that a person is a direct witness to the offense is
more indicative of reliability than a weak inference of some source of
inside information. Further, an informant who is almost surely a
fellow motorist, and thus a chance witness, is much less likely to have
a malicious hidden agenda than an informant with a source of inside
information.259

This issue has often come into play based either on J.L., which stated
that police had no reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant because
“[a]ll the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an
unknown, unknowable informant who neither explained how he knew
about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside
information,”260 or on the last two Sousa factors, which consider “third,
whether the tip was based upon contemporaneous eyewitness
observations . . . [and fourth,] whether the tip was sufficiently detailed
to permit the reasonable inference that the tipster has actually witnessed
an ongoing motor vehicle offense.”261 The United States Supreme
256. 980 N.E.2d 774, 783–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
257. Id. at 784; see also State v. Wood, No. 2010-350, 2011 WL 4976125, at *2 (Vt. Apr. 21,
2011) (distinguishing State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000), and holding that a tip that a small
gray car was operating erratically on Cedar Street, without giving a direction of travel, was not
sufficiently specific to justify a Terry stop).
258. Palmer, 980 N.E.2d at 784.
259. Vill. of Mundelein v. Thompson, 793 N.E.2d 996, 1004 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). But c.f.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 35 (“If anything, people tend to act more aggressively
toward their fellow motorists from the safety and anonymity of their cars than they would if they
were meeting on the sidewalk. On the road, anyone angered by the driver or passengers in
another car can get immediate revenge by placing a quick call to the authorities.”).
260. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (emphasis added).
261. People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting State v. Sousa, 855
A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court directly confirmed the importance of the caller’s personal
knowledge of the drunk or erratic driving in Navarette.262 Regardless
of exactly how the issue is framed in terms of the case authority, courts
are more likely to find the tip reliable if the tipster gives specific details
that support the inference that the tip is based on his personal
observations or other direct personal knowledge and is not a fabrication
designed to harass the suspect or distract the police.
The quantum of detail necessary, however, is uncertain. In Minx, the
caller’s report that a person was “driving recklessly” was deemed
insufficiently detailed despite the fact that the tip was made by another
motorist who made the report by cell phone while following the suspect
vehicle and presently observing the suspect’s driving as he phoned in
the tip, and who said he would be willing to sign a complaint.263
Although the arresting officer drove past the caller’s vehicle in pursuing
and stopping the suspect, he did not speak with the caller at all or get
any additional details from him; the arrest was based solely on the
caller’s report to the Mundelein police that the suspect was driving
recklessly.264 The Second District appellate panel determined that this
tip was insufficiently detailed to raise reasonable suspicion that would
justify a Terry stop.265
This conclusion strikes us as curious. Reckless driving is itself a
crime, defined as driving with “willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property,”266 and a lay citizen is competent to
identify it. While it is true that the caller gave no specific facts
supporting his conclusion that the suspect was driving recklessly, we
struggle to understand why the allegation that the suspect was driving in
a criminally unsafe manner was not sufficient to raise a reasonable
suspicion that a crime was in progress, 267 particularly when the tip bore
262. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 5–6 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014).
263. Vill. of Mundelein v. Minx, 815 N.E.2d 965, 968–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
264. Id. at 968–69, 971.
265. Id. at 972.
266. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-503(a)(1) (2013).
267. In Navarette, as in Minx, the tipster alleged reckless driving but not necessarily drunken
driving. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 19. The petitioners argued in the Supreme Court
that “[a] driver who has, perhaps out of necessity, made a single, seemingly reckless maneuver
plainly does not pose the same threat to the public as an obviously intoxicated driver unable to
control a vehicle,” and should not be treated as such. Id. at 31. The respondent answered that
“drunk drivers generally manifest their intoxicated status to the public by driving recklessly.”
Brief for Respondent at 38, Navarette, No. 12-9490 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
277 (2002) (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct.”)). Similarly, the United States, in its amicus brief, argued that
the risks to the public of reckless or aggressive driving, whether due to drunkenness, distraction,
or any other cause, are similar and equally deserving of intervention or investigation by police.
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other indicia of reliability.268
Indeed, the Fourth District in Ewing sharply criticized the reasoning
of Minx, stating that “Minx is simply wrong” because a non-anonymous
tip that someone is driving recklessly is sufficient by itself to raise
reasonable suspicion that would justify a Terry stop.269 In the Fourth
District’s view, police should be permitted to stop reportedly reckless
drivers, who may present a threat to other motorists, “without having to
question the caller about the specific details that led him or her to call so
long as the non-anonymous tip has a sufficient indicia of reliability
[sic].”270
The Ewing court also recognized, however, that Minx was
distinguishable from Ewing.271 In Minx, the caller merely saw someone
on the road driving recklessly.272 The Ewing court reasoned that,
although reckless driving is itself a crime, not all reckless driving
indicates drunkenness; the conduct that the caller saw and reported may
have been a mere “fleeting occurrence” and therefore a lesser danger to
public safety which might not warrant a lower threshold of reliability to
justify a Terry stop.273 In Ewing, by contrast, the caller was an
employee of a veterinary hospital who noticed that the defendant was
intoxicated when he came in to drop off his animal.274 Even though the
record did not show exactly what the defendant did that made the caller
believe that he was too drunk to drive, the court reasoned that it was fair
to infer that the caller had an opportunity, when the defendant came into
the veterinary hospital, to observe the “defendant’s speech, odor and
gait,” just as the employee-caller in Shafer had been able to conclude
that the defendant was intoxicated based on an encounter with him at a

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 23, at 24–25.
The Court ultimately adopted the reasoning of the respondent on this issue, explaining that “we
can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk driving,” and
twice citing Arvizu. See Navarette, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 8, 10.
268. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the other indicia of reliability);
see also State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 119–20 (Kan. 2003) (holding that a tip that a driver was
“driving recklessly” was sufficient to support an investigatory stop where the suspect driver was
found in the vehicle described by the tipster at the location described by the tipster).
269. People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 597–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
270. Id. at 598.
271. Id. at 597.
272. Id.
273. Id. But see People v. Hansen, 968 N.E.2d 164, 165–66, 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (stating
that callers reported a truck “doing donuts” in the road and “hot rodding” up and down the street
and that the men inside had been “running up and down through [the town]” and “screaming and
hollering,” and holding that such a tip was sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving); see supra notes 183–94 and accompanying text.
274. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 589.
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drive-thru window.275 Thus, even though the caller in Ewing did not
provide police with the factual details that led her to conclude that the
defendant was intoxicated, there was no need for such specificity where
the tip was not anonymous and was apparently based on an eyewitness,
in-person encounter.276
The distinction the Ewing court made between its facts and Minx, to
the extent the Ewing court considered it significant that reckless driving
may be a “fleeting occurrence,” may no longer make any difference in
light of Navarette. Navarette made clear that certain driving behaviors
that might be termed “reckless” are “sound indicia of drunk driving,”277
and it rejected the argument that observing an instance of reckless
driving, which may be due only to a momentary distraction, did not
provide reasonable suspicion, reasoning that “reasonable suspicion
‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’”278 However,
Navarette is distinguishable from Minx because the caller in Navarette,
unlike the caller in Minx, provided more than a mere conclusion that the
suspect was driving recklessly. She stated specific facts that led to that
conclusion; namely, that the suspect had run her off the road.279 It
would be going too far to say that Minx is no longer good law in light of
Navarette.
To sum up, in Minx, the only Illinois case to turn specifically on the
quantum of factual detail provided in the tip, the appellate court
determined that the allegation that the suspect was “driving recklessly”
was not specific enough to warrant a Terry stop, even though there were
other indicia of reliability.280 Although the court in Ewing explained
that this conclusion is vulnerable on the ground that it ignores the
danger that a reckless driver presents to the safety of the public,
especially to the extent that the driver’s recklessness may be due to
intoxication, the court also explained that Ewing is factually
275. Id. at 596–97 (citing People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding
that the proximity of the customer and employee-tipster supported the reliability of the tipster’s
observations)).
276. Illinois courts frequently place importance on whether the tipster states that he actually
saw the illegal conduct he describes to police. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 824 N.E.2d 1080,
1083–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (distinguishing J.L. and holding that a Terry stop was proper
because an informer told an officer that he “observed” a man displaying a gun); see also State v.
Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208, 211 (Iowa 2013) (distinguishing State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d
625 (Iowa 2001), and holding that the tip was not reliable because the tipster did not state that he
personally observed any impaired or erratic driving).
277. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014).
278. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
279. Id. at 1.
280. Vill. of Mundelein v. Minx, 815 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). But see supra note
268 and accompanying text.
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distinguishable from Minx, and its criticism of Minx may be dicta.281
Minx, though certainly weakened by Navarette, remains as somewhat
troubling precedent for law enforcement officers, and those receiving
tips of “reckless driving” would be prudent to seek, in addition to
tipsters’ conclusions that a person may be driving recklessly or driving
under the influence, specific facts supporting those conclusions, such as
when and where a suspect driver weaved between lanes, and to preserve
these details for the record. With such details in the record, the tip
would likely support a Terry stop under Navarette.
C. Is the Suspect Vehicle Being Presently Driven? Is the Public in
Danger?
Cases have also turned on whether the suspect vehicle is being
presently driven and thus represents a present threat to public safety. In
Shafer, the court held that tips concerning suspected drunk drivers
needed less corroboration because a drunk driver represents “an
imminent danger to the public that is difficult to thwart by means other

281. People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 597–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). It is tempting to believe
that Ewing started a war between the Illinois Appellate Court’s Fourth District and Second
District. In a subsequent decision, merely footnoted here because it is unpublished and noncitable in Illinois courts, the Second District cleaved to Minx, holding that a tip that the suspect
vehicle “cut off” the tipster in a Taco Bell parking lot was insufficient to support a Terry stop,
and it criticized Shafer and Ewing:
Shafer and Ewing can be harmonized with Minx only by holding that a report of
reckless driving must satisfy some standard of specificity, whereas a report of possible
intoxicated driving may be wholly conclusory. We see no reason to adopt such a dual
standard.
Indeed, although the Ewing court made a hair-splitting attempt to
distinguish Minx, the court ultimately declared that Minx was “simply wrong” and that
“[w]here a nonanonymous caller reports a reckless, erratic, or drunk driver, the police
must be permitted to stop the reported vehicle without having to question the caller
about the specific details that led him or her to call so long as the nonanonymous tip
has a sufficient indicia [sic] of reliability.” Ewing, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 597. We
disagree. 9-1-1 operators and police personnel manning nonemergency telephone lines
can certainly ask for such information. It would not be burdensome for them to simply
ask a caller why he or she believes that a particular motorist might be impaired, or in
what manner a motorist’s driving was erratic or reckless. Thus, we adhere to the
reasoning in Minx and conclude that, even where there are indicia of reliability that
permit an informant’s report to substitute for a police officer’s personal knowledge, the
bare assertion that a motorist is intoxicated will not substitute for at least a modicum of
information explaining the basis for the assertion.
City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley, Nos. 09-DT-1324, 09-TR-64136, slip op. ¶ 9 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec.
30, 2011) (unpublished order under Ill. S. Ct. Rule 23). But see State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115,
119 (Kan. 2003) (holding that conclusory statements that a suspect is driving recklessly can
justify a Terry stop because such a statement is “the kind of shorthand statement of fact that lay
witnesses have always been permitted to testify to in court” (citing State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038,
1045 (Kan. 1999))).
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than a Terry stop.”282
Ewing’s criticism of Minx was based
283
significantly on this logic.
The tip in Ewing was not much more
detailed or reliable than the tip in Minx, but in both cases the tipster
suggested that an intoxicated driver was presently driving on an Illinois
road, and “such drivers present an imminent danger to other motorists,”
which justifies a Terry stop even with corroboration of only innocent,
rather than inculpatory, details.284
However, Smulik held that this principle does not extend to potential
drunk drivers who are not actually driving.285 In Smulik, the tipster
stated that she had personally seen the defendant drinking at a bar and
she believed he was intoxicated when he got behind the wheel.286 The
case was thus factually similar to Ewing and Shafer with respect to the
tip. Nevertheless, the court reached a different result for two reasons:
(1) the suspect was not actually driving when the arresting officer
initiated the Terry stop; rather, he had pulled into a gas station, parked
in a parking spot, turned off the engine, and had a cigarette to “cool
down” from his argument with his friend earlier in the night,287 and (2)
the tip had to be treated as anonymous because the record did not show
whether the tipster provided her name or whether she called via an
emergency number, and greater corroboration was therefore required.288
Under these circumstances, the court stated that the arresting officer
should have corroborated the tip by initiating a “consensual encounter”
with the suspect, rather than immediately initiating a Terry stop.289
It is unclear based on the court’s opinion in Smulik whether the court
would have deemed a Terry stop justified if either the tip had been non282. People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
283. See Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597 (“While reckless driving may be a result of a drunk driver,
it may also be a fleeting occurrence. An intoxicated driver remains impaired as he or she
continues to drive. In fact, as noted in Shafer, an intoxicated driver presents a more imminent
danger than many other crimes . . . .”).
284. Id. at 598. Minx may have been distinguishable from Shafer and Ewing in this respect. It
is unclear whether the officer in Minx initiated the Terry stop while the suspect was driving or
after he had already pulled into his driveway. See Minx, 815 N.E.2d at 969 (stating that the
officer “activated his emergency lights either at [the moment the suspect turned into the
driveway] or shortly before reaching the driveway”). If the suspect had already pulled into his
driveway when the officer initiated the Terry stop, then Minx is like Smulik, and there was no
need to apply a lesser standard of corroboration based on the threat to public safety. In any case,
because the Minx court held that the tip was insufficiently detailed to raise reasonable suspicion
by itself, the court did not address or find any need to resolve the factual dispute over when the
Terry stop actually occurred.
285. People v. Smulik, 964 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
286. Id. at 186–87.
287. Id. at 184.
288. Id. at 186–87.
289. Id. at 189.
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anonymous or the suspected drunk driver had actually been driving
when the stop occurred, or if both of those conditions would have to
have been satisfied.290 Generally, of course, a Terry stop for suspicion
of drunk driving will occur while the suspect is driving, but would an
Illinois court hold that a driver can be pulled over on suspicion of DUI
based only on a truly anonymous tip, even a relatively strong one?
Since J.L., no Illinois court has ever so held. Thompson, Shafer, Ewing,
and Hansen all involved tips that, in one way or another, were deemed
not to be truly anonymous.
The drug/gun cases such as White, J.L., and Ledesma are of limited
usefulness on this question because they do not involve an imminent
threat to public safety. Indeed, the J.L. Court expressly stated that it did
not decide and would not speculate “about the circumstances under
which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to
justify a search even without a showing of reliability” such as, for
example, where the tip concerned a bomb set to explode.291 According
to White and Ledesma and their progeny, an anonymous tip is only
sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop if there are some indicia of
reliability such as predictions of future behavior that are proved correct,
even if only in innocent details.292 For example, in People v. Brown,293
the anonymous tip regarding a drug transaction contained no predictive
information and police corroborated only innocent details, so the case
was deemed identical to J.L. and the tip was found to be unreliable.294
On the other hand, in People v. Rollins,295 the anonymous tip contained
no predictive information and police were not able to corroborate any
inculpatory details before initiating the Terry stop, but the court held
that the tipster’s description of “ongoing public” criminal activity,
rather than concealed criminal activity, supported an inference that the
290. This question boils down to the simpler question of whether a truly anonymous tip may
give reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, because other cases establish that a person may
commit the offense of “driving” under the influence without actually driving. The statute
provides that a person “shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle” while
under the influence. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a) (2013) (emphasis added). “Actual
physical control of a vehicle requires only that one is behind the steering wheel in the driver’s
seat with the ignition key and physically capable of starting the engine and moving the vehicle.”
People v. Heimann, 491 N.E.2d 872, 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Thus, we can say with some
confidence that if the officer in Smulik had indisputably reliable information that the defendant
was drunk, an arrest would have been warranted; not only would the officer have had reasonable
suspicion to justify a Terry stop, but he also would have caught the defendant in flagrante delicto.
291. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000).
292. See discussion supra Part I.C.
293. People v. Brown, 798 N.E.2d 800, 808–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
294. Id.
295. People v. Rollins, 892 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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tipster must have actually witnessed criminal activity—an inference
which the dissent claimed was impermissible under J.L.—and provided
additional indicia of reliability. 296
Numerous cases in other
jurisdictions have used similar logic in the context of Terry stops to
investigate a tip of drunk driving.297
One Illinois Appellate Court case that is perhaps instructive in this
context, even though it is a gun case, is People v. Linley,298 in which a
tip that gunshots had been fired in a particular area did not permit a
Terry stop of a man in the area who may have behaved suspiciously. 299
To the extent that this situation is analogous to a tip of drunk driving,
this case may indicate that an anonymous tip of drunk driving does not
create reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop without some
corroboration or other indication of reliability.
In Linley, the arresting officer was dispatched to investigate a report
of gunshots in the vicinity of a bar known as the Two Wheel Inn.300 No
information appeared in the record to indicate who made the report or
how.301 While en route but still a short distance from the Inn, the
officer noticed a pickup truck idling in the street at the end of a
driveway.302 The defendant and another man were standing outside the
truck, speaking to someone within.303 As the officer approached, he
noticed that the defendant glanced at him, then glanced in the opposite
direction and backed away slightly from the truck as if he were about to
flee.304 The officer stopped and frisked the defendant and found

296. See id. at 26–27; id. at 29–30 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting); see also Bloomingdale v.
State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1219 (Del. 2004) (asserting that the basis of the tipster’s knowledge is less
important when, as in the case of most drunk driving tips, the offense reported is open to
observation by the general public, rather than concealed).
297. For example, the Supreme Court of California has explained that
in the context of reckless and possibly intoxicated driving, the tip’s lack of “predictive
information” [is] not critical to determining its reliability. Such an analysis is more
appropriate in cases involving tips of concealed criminal behavior such as possession
offenses. . . . An informant’s accurate description of a vehicle and its location provides
the tip with greater reliability than in the situation of a concealed firearm, because the
informant was presumably an eyewitness to illegal activity and his tip can be
sufficiently corroborated by the officer spotting the described vehicle in the expected
time and place.
People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815 (Cal. 2006) (citations omitted); see also supra note 182 and
cases cited therein.
298. People v. Linley, 903 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
299. Id. at 797–98.
300. Id. at 795.
301. Id. at 795, 797.
302. Id. at 794.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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cocaine in his pocket.305
The court explained that an investigatory stop need not be based on
the officer’s personal observations and may be based on an informant’s
tip, but the tip must bear some “indicia of reliability” in the totality of
the circumstances.306 A “significant factor” was whether the officer
was aware of facts tending to corroborate the tip.307 The court
recognized that there is authority that tips conveyed via an emergency
telephone number, such as 911, are not truly anonymous because
authorities can trace them instantly. 308 It also recognized, citing Shafer,
that the need for corroboration is lessened where the tip concerns an
imminent threat to public safety, such as a drunk driver. 309 However,
“it remains the case that a minimum of corroboration or other
verification of the reliability of the information is required.”310
The court reasoned that, because the officer was only acting based on
a dispatch and had no personal knowledge that gunshots were fired, the
State was obligated to prove that the information contained in the
dispatch was reliable.311 The State failed to meet this burden,
introducing absolutely no evidence “concerning the source or nature of
the information underlying the dispatch” and leaving the court to
speculate:312
Perhaps another officer heard gunfire, but was attending to other
duties and could not investigate.
More likely, perhaps, the
information came from a civilian. If that is the case, however, his or
her identity and the circumstances under which the information was
given are unknown. We do not know whether the informant was a
concerned citizen or a member of the criminal milieu; whether the
report was made in person or by telephone; whether the informant
identified himself or herself; whether the informant had a history of
providing reliable information or a reputation for giving false reports;
whether the report, if made by telephone, was made to an emergency
telephone number; whether the informant personally heard gunshots or
was relaying secondhand information; and whether the report was
contemporaneous with the gunfire.313

305. Id.
306. Id. at 795.
307. Id. at 797.
308. Id. at 796 (citing People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 363–64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)).
309. Id. at 796 (citing Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 365–66).
310. Id. at 795 (quoting Vill. of Mundelein v. Thompson, 793 N.E.2d 996, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
311. Id. at 797.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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Under Shafer, the threat to public safety presented by gunfire might
lessen the need for corroboration, but it did not “permit reliance on a
report lacking any indicia of reliability whatsoever.”314 The court held
that the dispatch alone did not justify the Terry stop.315
Of course, some factors distinguish Linley from drunk driving cases
such as Shafer and Ewing. For instance, in Linley there was no
description of the shooter or other information by which the police
could identify the shooter before performing the investigatory stop. 316
Further, the suspect was not in the immediate vicinity of the Two Wheel
Inn, the location of the gunshots reported by the tipster; rather, he was
several hundred yards away. There was therefore no basis for
reasonably suspecting that this might be the person who had fired the
gunshots that the tipster had reported. If the defendant matched a
description of the shooter given by the tipster, and if the investigating
officer found the defendant very near the location specified in the tip,
Linley might have been a different case, as the tip would have greater
indicia of reliability. True, it would still be a case, like J.L., in which
the tip was only specific enough to identify a particular person, without
containing any information bearing on the credibility of the tipster.
However, the danger to public safety presented by a recent shooter on
the loose, like the danger presented by a drunk driver on the roads,
distinguishes the case from J.L. and permits an investigatory stop with
“less rigorous corroboration.”317
314. Id.
315. Id. The court went on to hold that the fact that the defendant stepped back from the truck
and glanced away as if he were considering fleeing did not justify the Terry stop and frisk, either.
Id. at 798. While full-fledged flight is a significant factor to be considered in the totality of the
circumstances,
[t]he most that can be said is that [the officer] inferred that defendant briefly
contemplated fleeing. . . . [B]y any standard the predictive value of defendant’s
behavior is meager at best. Perhaps defendant thought about running away. Perhaps
he merely considered walking away. It is also possible that he was simply attempting
to determine what had brought the police to his home.
Id.; c.f. United States v. Sims, 296 F.3d 284, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “evasive”
behavior may raise reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, but declining to hold that the merely
“furtive” behavior of the defendant would have justified a Terry stop except for an anonymous tip
that a person fitting the defendant’s description had been firing a weapon in the vicinity).
316. Linley, 903 N.E.2d at 797.
317. People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see United States v.
Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an anonymous 911 tip giving police
the location of a man who had just fired gunshots in public gave police reasonable suspicion
which justified a Terry stop because “emergency reports are presumptively reliable”); United
States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (holding that “a
report by a person claiming to have seen a gun drawn in public provided articulable suspicion for
a Terry stop and frisk” where delaying action until the tip could be corroborated might “frustrate
the expedition that is essential to protect lives and safety”); United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314,
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Although the suggestion that danger to public safety may, in the
totality of the circumstances, justify a Terry stop even if it is based on
an anonymous tip of questionable reliability inspired intense debate at
oral argument in Navarette,318 the Supreme Court was mysteriously
silent on the validity of this proposition in its opinion. Perhaps the
majority felt that resorting to a lower threshold of reliability was simply
unnecessary in the case before it because, in the totality of the
circumstances, the tip was sufficiently reliable on its face and by its own
terms, regardless of the danger to public safety. It will fall to courts
and litigants in other cases to test this proposition further.
CONCLUSION
Now that the United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, it
may be that the Illinois Supreme Court will have no need to take up the
issue of whether and when anonymous tips may justify investigatory
stops, not only because Navarette has answered many of the questions
courts facing the issue have raised, but also because police will take
care to obtain detailed information from tipsters before initiating a stop.
If 911 operators and police gather sufficient information to identify the
suspect and determine the basis for the caller’s conclusion that he is
driving drunk, and they diligently preserve that information so that it
can be introduced in court, there should be no reason to find the tip
unreliable, even if the tipster is reluctant to give his name. The officer
or operator who receives the call should ask for a description of the
suspect vehicle which includes at least such items as the vehicle’s make,
model, license number, location, and bearing. He should also ask for
factual details supporting the caller’s conclusion that the driver is drunk.
Did the caller have an in-person encounter with the suspect, perhaps
319 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that “imminent threat to public safety” faced by officers responding
to a 911 tip that a person was driving drunk while carrying a weapon and threatening to shoot
someone “carries substantial weight in assessing the reasonableness of [the officers’] actions”).
318. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 36–47. Justice Kagan drove much of
the discussion on this point. For example, in an exchange that included her most pointed
comments, she asked counsel for the respondent if it was not “quite a substantial change in Fourth
Amendment law” to suggest that “when we decide whether reasonable suspicion exists, . . . that
we get to take into account how serious the offense is,” and counsel responded that “reasonable
suspicion results from a balancing of the governmental interest.” Id. at 36. Justice Kagan quickly
broke in,
[t]he balancing occurs categorically. We decide that there’s a reasonable suspicion
standard by balancing interests. What we don’t do is say, you know, depending on
how serious we think this crime is, more or less will meet that reasonable suspicion
standard. That would be a substantial reworking of Fourth Amendment law or so it
seems to me. Maybe I’m wrong.
Id.
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before he got behind the wheel, during which he noticed an odor of
alcohol, that the suspect was walking unsteadily, that his eyes were
glassy and bloodshot? Or did he notice that the suspect’s driving
appeared to be impaired because his vehicle was weaving across the
road and he could not stay in his lane? It will take the 911 operator a
minimal amount of time to acquire such information, and with these
facts in the record, a circuit court would be bound to find the tip
sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop under cases such as
Thompson, Shafer, Ewing, and Hansen, as well as Navarette.
Since Shafer held that 911 calls are not anonymous, the only Illinois
cases which have held that “anonymous” tips are unreliable are those
such as Smulik and Linley, which were likely not actually anonymous at
all. In Smulik, the tipster remained on the scene and spoke with the
arresting officer after the officer initiated the Terry stop; the tip was
only treated as anonymous because there was no evidence in the record
that the informant “provided her name or contacted police through an
emergency number” or otherwise put her anonymity at risk until after
the Terry stop had been initiated.319 In all likelihood, however, the
caller did call 911.320 Most people know no other way of reaching the
police to report wrongdoing. Similarly, in Linley, it seems likely that a
concerned citizen who had heard the gunshots called 911, but the court
would not presume that the tipster had put his anonymity at risk in this
way without any evidence to that effect in the record.321 As Navarette
demonstrates, as long as the record contains even basic information that
someone personally observed what appeared to be a drunk driving
offense and put his anonymity at risk by reporting it, an investigatory
stop of the suspect driver is likely justified.
Illinois courts remain diligent in refusing to forgive any laxity in
ensuring that an officer has reasonable suspicion before making an
investigatory stop of a suspected drunk driver. Neither the officer’s
mere hunch nor a private citizen’s is enough to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.322 An anonymous tip must bear some indicia of
reliability, which may be demonstrated by evidence that the tipster put
319. People v. Smulik, 964 N.E.2d 183, 186–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
320. See People v. Lomax, 975 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (‘“A 911 call is one of
the most common—and universally recognized—means through which police and other
emergency personnel learn that there is someone in a dangerous situation who urgently needs
help.”‘ (quoting United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2000))).
321. As stated above, however, the outcome in Linley may have been the same even if there
was such information in the record, as there was nothing to connect the defendant with the tip,
which reported gunshots at a tavern that was more than a quarter of a mile away and included no
description of the shooter.
322. United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 2001).
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his anonymity at risk or that the tip is based on the tipster’s personal
observations. Where such indicia are present, Illinois courts have been
willing to recognize a lower threshold for reasonable suspicion in the
case of a tip of drunk driving, based on the rationale that requiring the
officer personally and meticulously to corroborate the details of the tip
could only prolong the presence of a drunk driver on the roads and put
the lives of Illinois motorists in imminent danger.
The Illinois Supreme Court declined the opportunity to address this
issue directly in Ewing, denying the defendant Ewing’s petition for
leave to appeal,323 and it has not considered the issue since. Navarette
v. California has shed additional light on the matter, but leaves open the
question of whether the danger to public safety permits an officer to
initiate a Terry stop based on a tip that meets only a lower threshold of
reliability than would otherwise apply.324 Importantly, given that courts
interpret the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Illinois
Constitution in limited lockstep with the unreasonable search and
seizure clause of the United States Constitution, Navarette settles the
issue in Illinois, for as far as Navarette goes.325 For the time being, it is
clear that, so long as Illinois law enforcement authorities are diligent in
acquiring and preserving the facts that cast suspicion on potentially
drunk drivers, they can continue to rely on citizen informers to help to
eliminate the great danger to public safety that drunk drivers represent,
without having to delay stops to corroborate tips provided by citizen
informers themselves.

323. People v. Ewing, 882 N.E.2d 80 (Ill. 2008) (summary order denying petition for leave to
appeal).
324. See supra Part I.F; supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
325. See People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 44–45 (2006) (reaffirming limited lockstep
doctrine); see also Hon. John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine and the
Future of Judicial Federalism in Illinois, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 965 (2013); supra notes 31, 34 and
accompanying text.

